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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, Attorney General 
John Ashcroft announced a campaign of aggressive preventive detention. 
Invoking Robert Kennedy, the Attorney General announced that just as 
Kennedy would arrest a mobster for “spitting on the sidewalk,” so he, 
Ashcroft, would use every law in his power, including the immigration 
laws, to apprehend “suspected terrorists,” lock them up, and prevent the 
next terrorist attack.1  As of January 2004, the government had detained 
more than 5000 foreign nationals through its antiterrorism efforts.2 By any 
measure, the program has been spectacularly unsuccessful. None of these 
 
 
†  Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am indebted to Matt Dubeck, 
Melissa Duffy, Evan Nordby, and Steve Vladeck for research assistance, and to the editors of The 
Yale Law Journal, especially Holly A. Thomas, for their comments. Unless otherwise noted, all 
translations are those of the editors of The Yale Law Journal. 
1.  Attorney General John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks for the US Mayors Conference (Oct. 
25, 2001), at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarks10_25.htm. 
2. In the first seven weeks of the campaign, the government admitted to detaining 1182 
suspected terrorists, and virtually every time Ashcroft made a public statement he would give an 
update on the number of “suspected terrorists” detained. When people began to question why 
none of the 1182 persons had been charged with a terrorism-related crime, the Justice Department 
shifted gears and announced that it was too difficult to maintain a running total of detainees, so it 
would offer no further cumulative totals. Since then, however, the government has admitted to 
subjecting another 3900 people, virtually all foreign nationals, to preventive detention in 
antiterrorism initiatives in the United States, totaling more than 5000 in all. See DAVID COLE, 
ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON 
TERRORISM 24-25 (2003). 
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detainees has been determined to be involved with al Qaeda or the 
September  11  conspiracy.  Only  three  have  been  charged  with  any 
terrorism-related crime, and two of those three were acquitted of the 
terrorism charges.3  The lone conviction—for conspiring to support some 
unspecified terrorist activity in the unspecified future—has been called into 
question by the revelation that the prosecution failed to disclose evidence 
that its principal witness had lied on the stand.4 
In June 2003, the Justice Department’s own Inspector General issued a 
sharply  critical  report  on  the  preventive  detention  campaign,  finding, 
among other things, that people were detained and treated as “of interest” to 
the September 11 investigation on such information as an anonymous tip 
that there were “too many” Middle Eastern men working in a convenience 
store.5 Many were initially arrested without charges at all; over seven 
hundred of the arrests remain secret to this day; and more than six hundred 
detainees charged with immigration violations were tried in secret, without 
any showing that any information involved in their immigration hearings 
was classified.6 The vast majority were not only not charged with a terrorist 
crime, but were affirmatively cleared of any connection to terrorism by the 
FBI.7  Virtually all of the detainees were from predominantly Arab 
countries.8 
Prior mass preventive detention campaigns have been similarly 
unsuccessful and constitutionally suspect. In 1919, after terrorist bombs 
exploded virtually simultaneously in eight different cities across the United 
States,  the  Justice  Department  rounded  up  several  thousand  foreign 
nationals in what are now known as the Palmer Raids. They were herded 
into bullpens, interrogated without lawyers, and charged with technical 
immigration violations and association with various communist parties. 
Hundreds were  eventually deported. Not  one  was  found  to  have  been 
 
 
3.  The three charged with a terrorist crime were tried in Detroit in 2003, along with a fourth 
man who was not subjected to preventive detention, but was arrested only after he had been 
charged. See Dan Eggen & Allan Lengel, Alleged Leader of ‘Sleeper Cell’ Arrested in N.C., 
WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2002, at A28 (reporting the arrest of a fourth man, and noting that the first 
three were arrested within one week of September 11, 2001); Danny Hakim, 2 Arabs Convicted 
and 2 Cleared of Terrorist Plot Against the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2003, at A21. 
4.  Danny Hakim, Inquiries Begun into Handling of Detroit Terror Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
29, 2004, at A23. 
5.  OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: 
A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION 
WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 17 (2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/ 
special/0306/full.pdf [hereinafter OIG REPORT]. 
6.  COLE, supra note 2, at 26-31. 
7.  Id. at 240 n.15; OIG REPORT, supra note 5, at 69-70 (discussing the government’s “hold 
until cleared” policy, pursuant to which foreign nationals were detained until affirmatively cleared 
by the FBI of terrorist connections). 
8. See OIG REPORT, supra note 5, at 21. Those detained in the Special Registration and 
Absconder Apprehension Initiatives were singled out precisely because they were from nations 
with predominantly Arab or Muslim populations. COLE, supra note 2, at 49-51. 
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involved  with  the  bombings.9   And  in  the  most  infamous  preventive 
detention campaign in American history, 110,000 persons—U.S. citizens 
and foreign nationals alike—were rounded up and interned during World 
War II simply because of their Japanese ancestry. None was found to have 
engaged in sabotage or espionage, the stated justifications for the 
internment.10 
Thus, the three principal preventive detention experiences in the United 
States over the last century all resulted in the mass incarceration of people 
who turned out not to pose the national security threat that purportedly 
justified their detention in the first place. Moreover, each campaign was 
characterized by widespread constitutional abuse. Freed of the ordinary 
requirement that they demonstrate objective, individualized evidence of 
dangerousness or flight risk in order to detain suspects, law enforcement 
officials resorted instead to political association, racial and ethnic identity, 
and religion as proxies for suspicion. The Palmer Raids and the Japanese 
internment are widely acknowledged as two of the most shameful moments 
in American history; the detention of thousands of Arabs and Muslims after 
September 11 deserves a place in that dubious pantheon. 
These  examples  are  not  selectively  chosen;  there  are  no  mass 
preventive detention success stories in our history. In light of this history, 
some  searingly  recent,  Bruce  Ackerman’s  proposal  to  legitimate  the 
practice of suspicionless preventive detention during emergencies11  is 
strikingly ill-advised. History suggests that we ought to do everything we 
can to restrict suspicionless preventive detention, not to expand it. While 
individual instances of preventive detention, predicated on objective 
showings of danger or flight risk, undoubtedly serve an important security 
function,  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  suspicionless  preventive 
detention serves any legitimate purpose. Our Constitution already permits 
the suspension of habeas corpus in highly restricted settings,12 so restricted 
that it has been resorted to only four times—most famously by President 
Lincoln in the Civil War; by President Grant, to deal with the Ku Klux 
Klan during Reconstruction; by President Theodore Roosevelt, in the 
Philippines in 1905; and by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in Hawaii 
during World War II.13 Ackerman’s proposal would greatly expand the 
circumstances in which habeas corpus could in effect be suspended, without 
any showing that the “public safety requires it.” Yet he offers no reason to 
 
 
9.  See COLE, supra note 2, at 116-28. 
10.  See id. at 88-104; see also PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983). 
11.  See Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004). 
12.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
13. See MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES 3-112 (1991) (discussing Lincoln’s suspension of the writ); see also WILLIAM F. 
DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 178 n.190 (1980) (noting subsequent 
suspensions of the writ). 
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believe that such measures would make us more secure, and no response to 
the compelling historical record of abuse. 
Of course, Ackerman offers preventive detention only as an example of 
an emergency power under his “emergency constitution.” His ambition is 
not simply to design a preventive detention scheme; he calls for nothing 
less than a “sweeping revision of the emergency power provisions currently 
found in many of the world’s constitutions.”14 His basic idea is to give the 
Executive extraordinary emergency powers—including suspicionless 
preventive detention—while conditioning the state of emergency on a 
political process check—the “supermajoritarian escalator”—designed to 
forestall “permanent” emergencies. Inspired by South Africa’s constitution, 
Ackerman proposes that a majority vote be required to continue the 
emergency for the first two to three months, that a sixty-percent vote be 
required to extend the emergency two more months, that seventy percent be 
required for the next two months, and eighty percent thereafter.15  Under 
such a scheme, emergencies would be unlikely to last more than six to 
seven months in the absence of truly extraordinary consensus. 
Ackerman’s attempt to impose a meaningful but flexible time constraint 
on emergency powers is laudable: Undoubtedly one problem with “states of 
emergency” and their attendant powers is that they have a way of dragging 
on far longer than the actual emergency does. His insight that political 
process safeguards are critically important in checking emergency powers 
is perceptive and important, as is his sense that we should think about 
emergency powers now, before the next attack sends us into panic mode 
again. His solution is creative and, if adopted, might even work: The 
supermajoritarian escalator might actually succeed in putting an end to 
states of emergency in a timely manner. But time limits are only one 
problem with emergency powers, and a solution to the durational issue 
leaves unanswered the more difficult question of precisely what substantive 
powers ought to be assigned to the government for the duration of the 
emergency. 
The  sweeping  breadth  of  Ackerman’s  title,  approach,  and  stated 
ambition—to revise the world’s constitutions—appears to assume that all 
emergency powers issues in all constitutional systems are subject to a single 
elegant solution: His title is not A Preventive Detention Law for the United 
States, but The Emergency Constitution. But all emergency powers are not 
alike. Preventive detention is one possible response to the emergency posed 
by a terrorist attack, but there are many others. In the wake of September 
 
 
14.  Ackerman, supra note 11, at 1031. 
15.  See id. at 1047-49. South Africa is not the only nation to incorporate supermajoritarian 
rules into the authorization of emergencies. See Oren Gross, Providing for the Unexpected: 
Constitutional Emergency Provisions, 33 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 13, 31 n.95 (2004) (citing 
supermajoritarian requirements in the constitutions of Greece, Germany, South Africa, and India). 
COLEFINAL 4/30/2004 10:10 AM 
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11, for example, we have seen in the United States, to name just a few 
measures: increased reliance on surveillance and identification regimes; 
increased cooperation among foreign intelligence and domestic law 
enforcement agencies; efforts to limit access to potential targets; 
development of human intelligence sources; data mining; ethnic profiling; 
expanded criminal sanctions; the use of administrative measures to combat 
financing of terrorist groups; and increased use of the military to capture, 
hold, and try the “enemy.” Each of these initiatives raises distinct normative 
issues regarding the tradeoff between security and liberty, and few of those 
issues would be resolved by a “supermajoritarian escalator.” Rather, each 
initiative requires a direct assessment of distinct substantive value 
judgments. Like many  process scholars before him, Ackerman seeks a 
magic bullet where there is none. 
Ackerman’s failure to confront the difficult substantive tradeoffs that 
specific emergency powers present manifests itself in several ways in his 
preventive detention proposal. He would eliminate contemporaneous 
individualized judicial review of the need for any given instance of 
preventive detention, in order to “authorize[] the government to detain 
suspects  without . . . probable  cause  or   even  reasonable  suspicion.”16 
Instead,  he  would  substitute  an  ill-conceived  compensation  scheme, 
whereby “innocent detainees” would not be released, but would be paid for 
being locked up. Yet this solution fails to reconcile a fundamental 
contradiction  in  his  proposal:  Ackerman  wants  to  authorize  detention 
without suspicion, but at the same time wants to deter detention of innocent 
persons. The problem is that if detention without suspicion is expressly 
authorized, there is nothing illegal about detaining innocent persons. And 
by the same token, if it is wrong to detain innocent persons, as Ackerman’s 
compensation scheme seems to imply, why dispose of the threshold 
requirement of suspicion in the first place? 
Ackerman’s rationale appears to be that preventive detention does a 
public service (regardless of who is detained) by “reassuring” the public in 
times of “panic.” Ackerman’s “reassurance rationale” justifies preventive 
detention as a means of conveying the message that the state has matters 
“under control.”17  It is quite possible, as a purely descriptive matter, that 
preventive detention is reassuring in this way, especially when those being 
incarcerated are seen as different from the majority—say, communists, 
aliens, Japanese, or Arabs and Muslims. The public may well have been 
reassured by  the  Justice  Department’s frequent announcements of  how 
many hundreds of “suspected terrorists” it had apprehended in the weeks 
after September 11. But as the records of the Ashcroft and Palmer raids and 
 
 
16.  Ackerman, supra note 11, at 1037. 
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the Japanese internment all demonstrate, such reassurance is a fiction paid 
for by innocents. 
At bottom, what is most troubling about Ackerman’s proposal is that in 
his fascination with the idea of the “supermajoritarian escalator,” he never 
addresses the fundamental normative question presented by his proposal. 
As a normative matter, it is one thing to say, as the Framers did, that in 
response to a “rebellion” or “invasion,” habeas corpus may be suspended 
when “the public safety may require it”; it is another thing entirely to argue, 
as Ackerman does, that we should empower the Executive to incarcerate 
individuals for up to two months without suspicion, even in the absence of 
any  threat  to  the  nation’s  existence,  merely  to  “reassure”  a  public  in 
“panic.”  Putting  innocent  people  who  pose  no  danger  behind  bars  to 
reassure a panicked public is normatively unacceptable, no matter what 
“supermajoritarian escalator” has been put in place, and no matter how 
much we “compensate” them after the fact. Ackerman seems to have been 
carried away by what he calls “the priority of checks and balances.”18 While 
a political process check may be an important supplement to a regime of 
limited emergency powers, it is no substitute for the hard work of striking 
an appropriate normative balance between liberty and security. Call it the 
priority of morality. 
My Essay takes on three aspects of Ackerman’s thesis—its premises, its 
efficacy, and its morality. Part I critiques three of Ackerman’s premises— 
his  underestimation  of  courts  and  overestimation  of  legislatures  as 
guardians  of  liberty,  his  misguided  belief  that  the  supermajoritarian 
escalator provides a one-size-fits-all solution to the conundrum of 
emergency powers, and his contention that the short-lived character of 
emergencies makes it sensible to cede to a minority of our popular 
representatives control over critically important and largely unpredictable 
decisions concerning the appropriate duration of emergency powers. 
Part II turns to the details, and finds fatal shortcomings in the proposed 
implementation of Ackerman’s scheme. First, the limits it prescribes would 
do nothing to respond to the preventive detention abuses so evident in the 
post-September 11 roundup; with the exception of three individuals held as 
“enemy  combatants,”  all  the  domestic  detentions  were  accomplished 
without resort to any “emergency” powers. Second, Ackerman’s after-the- 
fact compensation scheme fails to confront the basic question of who 
deserves compensation and why. As a result, the scheme would not have 
the deterrent effect he claims and, on the contrary, would legitimate 
detention of innocent people. Third, despite Ackerman’s purported quid pro 
quo of preventive detention authority for a supermajoritarian escalator 
check,  many  and  perhaps  most  preventive  detentions  would  never  be 
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affected by the supermajoritarian escalator, as they would typically occur in 
the initial weeks following the attacks, before the escalator kicks in. 
Part III contends that Ackerman has failed to confront the central 
normative questions presented by his proposal—namely, whether it is ever 
justified to incarcerate innocent people without suspicion, whether 
reassuring a public in panic is an acceptable justification for such 
suspicionless detention, and whether preventive detention without prompt 
judicial review ought to be countenanced outside a battlefield. Ackerman 
proposes to do away with the two guarantees essential to any acceptable 
system of nonwartime preventive detention—a threshold requirement of 
objective suspicion and access to prompt judicial review. Eliminating either 
guarantee would violate fundamental commands of both American 
constitutional law and international human rights law. Indeed, detaining 
people without suspicion in the name of reassuring a panicked public 
violates basic commitments of a moral society by treating individuals not as 
ends in themselves, but as means to a dubious public relations end. Such a 
scheme can be defended, if at all, only on the crudest utilitarian grounds, 
grounds that Ackerman himself in earlier work has strongly and correctly 
condemned.19 Even from a utilitarian perspective, moreover, it is not clear 
how suspicionless preventive detention would maximize overall utility, as a 
detention scheme that eliminates suspicion as a predicate for detention 
should reassure no one. 
Perhaps September 11 “changed everything,” including Ackerman’s 
own moral judgments, but I hope it did not alter our common commitment 
to treat people as ends in themselves. If that commitment continues, the 
desire to reassure a public in panic cannot justify dispensing with suspicion 
and timely judicial review, the necessary prerequisites to any sensible and 
normatively acceptable system of preventive detention. My claim is not that 
preventive detention is never justified, for it clearly is under appropriate 
conditions; my claim is that preventive detention without suspicion and 
without judicial review is not justified in the name of making the public feel 
better. 
 
I. PREMISES 
 
Ackerman’s thesis rests on a chilling description of the threat posed to 
civil liberties in the post-September 11 world. He predicts that we are likely 
to see increasingly frequent terrorist attacks with increasingly powerful 
weapons, and that each attack will be seen as evidence that prior expansions 
of government power didn’t go far enough. In effect, each attack will shift 
 
 
19.  See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 343 (1980); 
see also infra text accompanying notes 188-190. 
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the baseline in the tradeoff between liberty and security, leading to further 
and further inroads on basic civil liberties.20 
Echoing conventional wisdom, Ackerman maintains that we cannot rely 
on courts to stem the tide, because in times of crisis and on matters of 
national security, judges have generally been overly deferential to executive 
national security claims.21  He sensibly recommends taking “some of the 
load off judges in managing front-line legal responses, and creat[ing] new 
constitutional structures that will more reliably respond to the recurring 
tragedies of the coming century.”22 His solution, outlined above, is to grant 
emergency powers subject to the “supermajoritarian escalator.” In this way, 
the  Executive  may  be  granted  sufficient  authority  to  deal  with  the 
emergency at hand, subject to a political process safeguard designed to limit 
the duration of such emergency powers. 
Ackerman’s concerns about the threat of terrorism are legitimate and 
widely shared. Terrorists’ access to increasingly destructive weapons, the 
spreading phenomenon of suicide terrorism, and the possibility that 
September 11 has dramatically raised the bar for the scale of carnage that 
terrorists are willing to inflict all pose real threats to our security and in turn 
to  our  liberty.  The  tendency  of  states  of  emergency  to  outlast  the 
 
 
 
20.  Ackerman, supra note 11, at 1029-30. 
21.  See id. at 1042-43. Many have made this point before him. Clinton Rossiter,  in an 
influential study of the Court in wartime, concluded: 
[T]he courts of the United States, from highest to lowest, can do nothing to restrain and 
next to nothing to mitigate an arbitrary presidential-military program suspending the 
liberties of some part of the civilian population . . . . Whatever relief is afforded, and 
however ringing the defense of liberty that goes with it, will be precious little and far 
too late. 
CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 52-53 (expanded ed. 
1976). 
Judge Learned Hand similarly concluded that one cannot rely on the courts in times when the 
people do not fight for their own rights: 
I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon constitutions, upon 
laws and upon courts. These are false hopes. . . . Liberty lies in the hearts of men and 
women;  when  it  dies  there,  no  constitution,  no  law,  no  court  can  save  it;  no 
constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it. While it lies there it needs 
no constitution, no law, no court to save it. 
LEARNED HAND, The Spirit of Liberty (May 21, 1944), in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND 
ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 189, 189-90 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960). 
And in Korematsu, Justice Jackson similarly warned: 
Of course the existence of a military power resting on force, so vagrant, so 
centralized, so necessarily heedless of the individual, is an inherent threat to liberty. But 
I would not lead people to rely on this Court for a review that seems to me wholly 
delusive. . . . If the people ever let command of the war power fall into irresponsible 
and unscrupulous hands, the courts wield no power equal to its restraint. The chief 
restraint upon those who command the physical forces of the country, in the future as in 
the past, must be their responsibility to the political judgments of their contemporaries 
and to the moral judgments of history. 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
22.  Ackerman, supra note 11, at 1044-45. 
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emergency, and that of judges to defer to the Executive in times of crisis, 
have long been noted.23 
But Ackerman’s proposal rests on three questionable premises. He is 
too dismissive of the role of courts and too optimistic about the role of 
legislatures in checking emergency powers; he places too much faith in the 
ability of a single process—the “supermajoritarian escalator”—to solve the 
multiple problems that emergency powers pose; and his notion that we 
should precommit to be bound by a twenty-one-percent minority assumes 
without foundation that terrorist threats are likely to be short-lived. 
 
A.  Courts and Legislatures 
 
The basic tradeoff Ackerman proposes is to eliminate contemporaneous 
judicial review of the legality of detention in exchange for a 
supermajoritarian escalator. To do so is not to give up all that much, he 
suggests, because courts are largely ineffectual on matters of national 
security. There is substantial and familiar evidence to support that charge. 
The Supreme Court did not question Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus 
and reliance on martial law until after the Civil War had ended.24 It upheld 
criminal convictions for antiwar speech during World War I25 and the 
Japanese internment in World War II.26 And it permitted the harassment of 
communists in the Cold War until years after Senator Joe McCarthy had 
been censured.27 
But this conventional wisdom is often overstated. It rests on a kind of 
closeup snapshot view of the role courts have played. When one pans back 
and reviews the influence of judicial decisions over time on emergency 
measures, the picture is decidedly less bleak. The Supreme Court eventually 
adopted rules that prohibit punishment for subversive speech and guilt by 
association,28 and these decisions essentially take those options off the table 
for future emergencies, thereby protecting those who would otherwise have 
 
 
 
23. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN 
WARTIME 218-25 (1998); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises 
Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1034, 1070-71 (2003). 
24.  See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
25.  See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 
(1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 
(1919). 
26.  See Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214; see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
27.  See ARTHUR J. SABIN, IN CALMER TIMES: THE SUPREME COURT AND RED MONDAY 
(1999); William M. Wiecek, The Legal Foundations of Domestic Anticommunism: The 
Background of Dennis v. United States, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 375. 
28.  See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (subversive speech); United States v. 
Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (guilt by association); see also Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 
(1961) (noting that guilt by association violates the First and Fifth Amendments, but upholding a 
conviction on the basis of proof of specific intent to further the unlawful ends of a group). 
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been the subjects of such sanctions. Were the government to detain an 
individual for his speech, his race, or his membership in a political 
organization today—as was routinely done during prior crises—one would 
fully expect courts to step in and overrule such initiatives. That expectation 
largely   precludes   reliance   on   these   tactics,   the   favorites   of   past 
emergencies, in future emergencies.29 
Thus, even if courts often appear overly deferential in the midst of an 
emergency, they play an important function over time in limiting what can 
be done in the next emergency. Courts are well-suited to this role for 
several  reasons.  They  continue  to  review  and  rule  upon  emergency 
measures long after the immediate crisis has passed, and therefore often 
have the advantage of hindsight. The common law method permits 
adjustments based on the lessons of experience, as illustrated by the 
evolution of increasingly protective standards for subversive speech, 
culminating in Brandenburg v. Ohio.30 Courts take up issues of emergency 
powers not in the abstract—as Ackerman has done in his essay, and as 
legislatures generally do—but in the context of specific cases. Unlike the 
political branches, which can and do ignore the claims of those without 
power, courts have an obligation to hear the grievances of all those who 
claim to have been harmed. Courts must give reasons for their decisions, 
which, by the force of stare decisis, restrict what can be done in the next 
emergency. And the availability of contemporaneous judicial review to 
enforce the lessons learned from past emergencies constrains what the 
Executive can do in future ones.31 
Of course, courts do not always do the right thing. Ackerman points to 
Korematsu as his leading example, and asks, “If Hugo Black fell down on 
the job, will his successors do any better?”32  I think the answer is quite 
likely yes, not because I have more faith in the current members of the 
Supreme Court, but because it is now so widely acknowledged that Justice 
Black and the rest of the Korematsu majority did fall down on the job. 
Contrary to Justice Jackson’s prediction that Korematsu would lie about 
like a “loaded weapon,”33 the decision has been invoked subsequently only 
as an object lesson in what not to do with respect to emergencies. Eight of 
 
 
29.  This is not to say that judicial decisions prevent government officials from repeating past 
mistakes. See David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 
38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2003) (arguing that the government has repeated many of the same 
tactics that it employed in past crises by slightly altering its methods to avoid direct confrontation 
with legal precedents). But constitutional doctrine does preclude some options and provides 
important arguments for challenging new tactics that come too close to prior practices. 
30.  For an analysis of this evolution, see David Cole, Agon at Agura: Creative Misreadings 
in the First Amendment Tradition, 95 YALE L.J. 857 (1986). 
31.  I develop this point in David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and 
Individual Rights in Times of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565 (2003). 
32.  Ackerman, supra note 11, at 1043. 
33.  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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the nine sitting Supreme Court Justices have condemned it,34 a lower court 
has vacated Korematsu’s conviction,35  and Congress has issued a formal 
apology   and   paid   reparations  to   the   survivors.36    And   while   often 
overlooked, the same day that the Court issued its decision in Korematsu, it 
also ruled, in Ex parte Endo,37 that the government was obligated to release 
internees found not to pose a danger of sabotage or espionage. While Endo 
rested on statutory and regulatory grounds, the Court’s rationale was plainly 
driven by constitutional concerns.38 Thus, while Korematsu should give us 
pause, it should not cause us to dismiss the courts altogether. 
To be sure, Ackerman does not propose eliminating judicial review. He 
seeks only to bar courts from assessing the legality of detention while it is 
ongoing, in order to permit the government to hold individuals without 
establishing any objective basis for suspicion. He would limit the detention 
to forty-five to sixty days, and permit only after-the-fact judicial evaluation 
of its legality.39 Given the courts’ record of performing better in assessing 
national security measures after the emergency has passed, it is conceivable 
that this after-the-fact approach might even lead to greater legal protection 
for detainees over the long haul. But as I show in Part II, because Ackerman 
would expressly authorize detention without any objective basis for 
suspicion, it is not at all clear what an “illegal” detention would be. The 
only examples Ackerman posits—those driven by personal animus or based 
exclusively on race—are likely to be so rare as to be entirely 
inconsequential. Since the whole point of Ackerman’s proposal is to 
authorize  detention  without  suspicion,  even  wholly  arbitrary  detentions 
 
 
 
 
34. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (placing 
Korematsu on par with Dred Scott); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) 
(O’Connor, J.) (writing for the majority, in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, that “Korematsu demonstrates vividly that even the most 
rigid scrutiny can sometimes fail to detect an illegitimate racial classification. Any retreat from the 
most searching judicial inquiry can only increase the risk of another such error occurring in the 
future” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 244 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring, in an 
opinion joined by Justice Ginsburg, to the “shameful burdens” that the government imposed upon 
Japanese Americans during World War II, some of which the Court upheld in Korematsu); id. at 
275 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (characterizing Korematsu, in an opinion joined by Justice Breyer, 
as a decision in which “scrutiny the Court described as ‘most rigid,’ nonetheless yielded a pass for 
an odious, gravely injurious racial classification” (citation omitted)); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 
497 U.S. 547, 633 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (concluding, in an opinion joined by Justice 
Scalia, that “[e]ven strict scrutiny may not have sufficed to invalidate early race-based laws of 
most doubtful validity, as we learned in Korematsu”), overruled on other grounds by Adarand, 
515 U.S. 200. 
35.  Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (granting a writ of 
coram nobis to vacate Korematsu’s conviction). 
36.  Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1989-1989d (2000). 
37.  323 U.S. 283, 302 (1944). 
38.  See id. at 299-300; REHNQUIST, supra note 23, at 202. 
39.  See Ackerman, supra note 11, at 1070-71. 
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would appear to be permissible, so long as they were not based solely on 
personal or racial animus. 
Substituting a political safeguard for a judicial safeguard also seems 
unwise in light of the history of legislative action during emergencies. If 
anything, legislatures seem even less reliable than courts as protectors of 
liberty during times of crisis. The legislature generally rallies around the 
President, spurs him on, grants him expansive powers, and ratifies his 
initiatives: While a judicial decision comparing the Executive’s conduct 
during the Palmer Raids to that of a “mob”40 was instrumental in checking 
this abuse of power,41 Congress’s only response to the raids was to threaten 
impeachment of Acting Secretary of Labor Louis Post when he intervened 
to overturn many of the resulting deportations.42 During World War II, 
Congress repeatedly appropriated funds to run the Japanese internment 
camps.43  And during the Cold War, Congress—and especially the House 
Committee on Un-American Activities—was a principal driving force 
behind McCarthyism.44 
Congress has performed no more courageously in the current crisis. Six 
weeks after the attacks of September 11, it passed the USA PATRIOT 
Act,45 giving the Executive expansive new powers to conduct searches, 
freeze assets, criminalize speech, and detain and deport foreign nationals.46 
Since then, Congress has been silent on the issue of emergency measures, 
while the President has unilaterally assumed broad new powers without 
congressional approval.47 The tendency of a collective to avoid hard choices 
 
 
40. Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 F. 17, 43 (D. Mass. 1920), rev’d sub nom. Skeffington v. 
Katzeff, 277 F. 129 (1st Cir. 1922). 
41.  COLE, supra note 2, at 124. 
42.  Id. at 123-24. 
43.  See Endo, 323 U.S. at 303 n.24 (noting the various congressional appropriations). 
44. See MICHAL R. BELKNAP, COLD WAR POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE SMITH ACT, THE 
COMMUNIST PARTY, AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES (1977); ROBERT K. CARR, THE HOUSE 
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, 1945-1950 (1952); ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE 
THE CRIMES: MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA (1998). 
45.  Uniting  and  Strengthening  America  by  Providing  Appropriate  Tools  Required  To 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 
272 (to be codified in scattered sections of 8, 12, 18, 21, 22, 28, 31, 47, and 50 U.S.C.). 
46.  See Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, No. CV 03-6107 ABC, 2004 WL 547534 
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2004) (declaring void for vagueness the USA PATRIOT Act’s criminalization 
of the provision of “expert advice and assistance” to designated terrorist organizations). In the 
interest of full disclosure, I should note that I am counsel for plaintiffs in this suit. See also 
NANCY CHANG, SILENCING POLITICAL DISSENT: HOW POST-SEPTEMBER 11 ANTI-TERRORISM 
MEASURES THREATEN OUR CIVIL LIBERTIES 43-66 (2002); STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, THE 
ENEMY WITHIN: INTELLIGENCE GATHERING, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE 
WAKE OF SEPTEMBER 11, at 29-54 (2002). 
47.  Shortly after September 11, the Executive issued a military order permitting terrorists to 
be tried and executed by military courts with no independent judicial review, Military Order of 
November 13, 2001—Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against 
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001); asserted the power to hold “enemy combatants” 
indefinitely and incommunicado, see, e.g., Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 710 (2d Cir. 2003), 
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is at its zenith in periods of crisis. In addition, the political reality for both 
the Executive and the legislature is that they will take a bigger political 
“hit” if another terrorist attack occurs under their watch than if they violate 
the constitutional rights of innocent persons—especially if, as is so often 
the  case,  the  violations  are  largely  directed  at  foreign  nationals  and 
shrouded in secrecy.48  There is unfortunately little basis for believing that 
Congress will ever be a safeguard for liberty in dangerous times. 
Even where Congress has acknowledged its institutional shortcomings 
and enacted a framework statute to attempt to offset some of these 
weaknesses, as Ackerman proposes here, its efforts have failed. The War 
Powers Resolution, passed to end unilateral executive warmaking, requires 
the withdrawal of troops within ninety days of the President introducing 
them to imminent hostilities absent congressional approval49—but with a 
single exception, Congress has never acted to enforce that requirement.50 
The National Emergencies Act of 1976, designed to put an end to indefinite 
states of emergency, requires Congress to meet and confer on any declared 
state of emergency every six months,51  yet Congress has never done so.52 
Thus, if the courts are no guarantee of courageous rights protection, the 
legislature may be even worse.53 
In theory, were the legislature ever to work up the will to act, its checks 
on executive power might be more effective than a judicial decision. The 
President  might  be  more  inclined  to  ignore  a  judicial  ruling,  as  did 
President  Lincoln  when  Supreme  Court  Chief  Justice  Taney  held  his 
 
 
cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (2004) (No. 03-1027); issued a regulation authorizing monitoring of 
attorney-client communications without judicial approval, National Security; Prevention of Acts 
of Violence and Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 55,062, 55,063 (Oct. 31, 2001) (codified at 28 C.F.R. 
pts. 500-01); and engaged in a massive preventive detention campaign using immigration law, in 
which foreign nationals were arrested in secret, held without charges or any showing of 
dangerousness or flight risk for extended periods, and tried in secret, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
PRESUMPTION OF GUILT: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES OF POST-SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES (2002), 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/us911/USA0802.pdf; see also OIG REPORT, supra note 5. 
48.  See generally COLE, supra note 2, at 4-5, 228-33. 
49.  Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 5(b), 87 Stat. 555, 556 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) 
(2000)). The Act has a base requirement that the Executive seek congressional approval within 
sixty days, but permits a thirty-day extension “if the President determines and certifies to the 
Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States 
Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a 
prompt removal of such forces.” Id. § 1544(b)(3). 
50.  See Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 
1413-15 (1989). The lone exception was a joint congressional-executive compromise over the 
Lebanon crisis in the early 1980s. See id. at 1415 n.159. 
51.  Pub. L. No. 94-412, § 202(b), 90 Stat. 1255, 1256 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1622(b)). 
52.  Lobel, supra note 50, at 1415-16. 
53.  This  problem  is  not  limited  to  the  United  States.  See  Gross,  supra  note  15,  at  41 
(observing the same problem in Israel); see also GAD BARZILAI, A DEMOCRACY IN WARTIME: 
CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS IN ISRAEL 247-60 (1992) (same); BRUCE RUSSETT, CONTROLLING 
THE SWORD: THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF NATIONAL SECURITY 34-38 (1990) (same). 
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unilateral suspension of habeas corpus illegal in Ex parte Merryman,54 than 
to ignore Congress, a politically responsive branch with the power of the 
purse. But that assumes Congress would in fact act to check the President. 
Precisely because it is politically responsive, the legislative branch is 
generally likely to be less willing to stand up to the President than are the 
courts in times of crisis, when the easy political course is to trumpet the 
necessity for broad national security measures. 
It is also possible to argue that a legislative process check is preferable 
to judicial review precisely because the legislature’s decisions are not 
subject to stare decisis. The legislature’s decision to continue a particular 
emergency, for example, will have no adverse precedential effects, while a 
court’s decision to distort the Constitution in order to uphold a given 
emergency power may do lasting damage. But the only determination 
Ackerman would give to the legislature during the course of an emergency 
is whether the state of emergency continues—a decision that, no matter 
who makes it, is likely to be highly fact- and context-specific, and to have 
relatively little precedential value. On the substantive question of what the 
government may do during an emergency, if Ackerman were to have his 
way our Constitution (and indeed all of the world’s constitutions) would 
affirmatively authorize suspicionless preventive detention without timely 
judicial  review.  That  would  be  a  precedent  far  worse,  and  far  less 
susceptible to common law adjustment and reevaluation, than a judicial 
decision on the legality of a specific detention. 
It is especially unwise to dismiss the courts when it comes to the state’s 
power to lock up human beings. As a general rule, detainees tend not to 
have much political influence or public sympathy; if they did, they would 
not be detained in the first place. Detainees therefore are unlikely to get the 
attention of the political branches; the only detainees who got President 
Lincoln’s attention during the Civil War were those few with influential 
political connections.55  For a person behind bars, the courts are generally 
the only hope, because the courts are the only branch of government 
obligated to consider the legality of his detention. The “great writ” of 
habeas corpus reflects precisely this understanding. In my legal career, I 
have watched eleven clients walk free from jail because judges refused to 
countenance government claims that national security concerns about 
terrorism required their detention on secret evidence.56  In none of those 
cases were we able to generate sufficient interest from Congress to assist 
the detainees, despite substantial efforts. For these individuals, as for most 
people behind bars, it was the courts or nothing. 
 
 
54.  17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) (Taney, Circuit Justice). 
55.  See NEELY, supra note 13, at 117. 
56.  See David Cole, Secrecy, Guilt by Association, and the Terrorist Profile, 15 J.L. & 
RELIGION 267 (2000-2001) (recounting these cases). 
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Consider also the cases of Jose Padilla and Yaser Esam Hamdi, the two 
U.S. citizens being held in military custody incommunicado, indefinitely, 
and without charges or trial, as “enemy combatants.” They have each been 
incarcerated for over two years, and largely because they are citizens, their 
cases have received extensive attention in the media. Yet Congress has 
taken no action whatsoever to respond to their plight. The courts, by 
contrast, have seriously grappled with Padilla’s and Hamdi’s cases. While 
the judicial record (especially that of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit) has been far from exemplary, all the courts have thus far 
rejected the government’s most sweeping assertions of unilateral authority 
to detain.57 Against the government’s wishes, the Supreme Court has agreed 
to review the detentions of Hamdi and the foreign nationals held on 
Guantánamo.58 Courts are of course no panacea; like all human institutions, 
 
 
57.  The Fourth Circuit rejected the government’s initial claim that habeas corpus review did 
not  lie,  Hamdi  v.  Rumsfeld  (Hamdi  II),  296  F.3d  278,  283  (4th  Cir.  2002),  although  it 
subsequently rubber-stamped the detention on what it characterized as the “undisputed” fact that 
Hamdi was captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi III), 316 F.3d 
450, 459 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004) (No. 03-6696). The district court in 
Hamdi correctly refused to treat this fact as “undisputed” (it could not be undisputed, as no one 
had ever heard from Hamdi) and insisted that the government make a detailed showing that 
Hamdi was in fact fighting for the enemy. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 534 (E.D. 
Va. 2002), rev’d, 316 F.3d 450. Dissenting from the Fourth Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc, 
Judges Michael Luttig and Diana Gribbon Motz also noted that treating the circumstances of 
Hamdi’s  capture  as  “undisputed”  was  wholly  unjustified.  Hamdi  v.  Rumsfeld  (Hamdi  IV), 
337 F.3d 335, 360-61 (4th Cir. 2003) (Luttig, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id. 
at 371-72 (Motz, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
In Padilla’s case, the district court ruled that it had authority to review the assertions made by 
the Executive for treating Padilla as an enemy combatant, and further held, over vociferous 
objections by the government, that Padilla had the right of access to a lawyer for any such hearing. 
Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). After adhering to the 
decision on reconsideration, Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003), the district court certified the case for appeal to the Second Circuit, Padilla ex rel. Newman 
v. Rumsfeld, 256 F. Supp. 2d 18 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The court of appeals held that the President 
lacked authority to hold American citizens, and ordered Padilla’s release. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 
352 F.3d 695, 724 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (2004) (No. 03-1027). 
58.  See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. 981 (granting certiorari); Al Odah v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 534 
(2003) (mem.) (granting certiorari). The Court has also granted review in Padilla’s case, at the 
government’s request. See Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 1353. Even if, as is quite possible, the Supreme 
Court ultimately defers to the Executive’s claims to some extent in these cases, the very fact that it 
agreed to hear the cases appears to have put pressure on the Bush Administration to temper its 
positions.  After  the  Supreme  Court  announced  that  it  would  review  the  Guantánamo  cases, 
making it almost a foregone conclusion that it would also review the detentions of Hamdi and 
Padilla, the government announced plans to release a large number of the Guantánamo detainees 
and to allow Hamdi and Padilla eventual, controlled access to their lawyers. Anthony Lewis, The 
Justices Take on the President, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2004, at A21. It subsequently released 
several juveniles held at Guantánamo, explained for the first time its internal processes for 
identifying enemy combatants, and announced that it would provide annual parole-like hearings 
for the Guantánamo detainees. See Vernon Loeb, U.S. To Assess Detainees’ Cases, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 15, 2004, at A1; John Mintz, U.S. Releases 3 Teens from Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 
2004, at A1. At an earlier stage, the government abandoned arguments that courts have no power 
whatsoever to review the detentions of U.S. citizens as enemy combatants, after the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the most conservative court of appeals in the country, had rejected 
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they are subject to immense political pressure in times of crisis. But courts 
are surely less susceptible to those pressures than the politically responsive 
legislature and Executive, and thus there may well be no better alternative. 
We should be extremely hesitant to write courts out of their historic role of 
assessing the legality of executive detention. The writ of habeas corpus is 
guaranteed for a reason. 
 
B.  One Size Does Not Fit All 
 
The second problematic premise underlying Ackerman’s proposal is 
that  emergency  powers  are  all  alike,  and  that  therefore  the 
supermajoritarian escalator is somehow a solution to the problem of 
emergency powers writ large. In fact, emergency powers take almost as 
many forms as emergencies do, and raise a host of difficult and distinct 
civil liberties questions, very few of which would be solved by a 
supermajoritarian  escalator.  The  escalator  addresses  only  one  problem 
with emergency powers—their tendency to last beyond the period of the 
actual emergency. But duration is by no means the only—or even the 
principal—problem that states of emergency pose. Ackerman’s solution is 
partial at best, and at worst it fails to grapple with the truly difficult 
questions posed by the war on terrorism’s effect on civil liberties. 
Consider our experience with preventive detention, which Ackerman 
calls “the core of the emergency power.”59  The problem with the Palmer 
Raids, the Japanese internment, and the Ashcroft roundup was not that 
emergency power was unjustifiably extended. The Palmer Raids were 
carried out over a couple of months, and its detentions lasted in most cases 
less than a year.60 The Japanese internment did not extend beyond the war.61 
And the vast majority of those swept up in Ashcroft’s preventive detention 
campaign were released within several months of their detention.62  What 
was wrong with these schemes was not the duration of detention but the 
fact that detention was for all practical purposes suspicionless: Thousands 
of people who posed no danger were nonetheless rounded up, not based on 
objective, individualized suspicion, but often based in significant part on 
their perceived racial, ethnic, religious, or political identities. Developing 
 
 
that  proposition.  See  Hamdi  II,  296  F.3d  at  283.  These  actions  demonstrate  that  the  very 
possibility of judicial review plays a checking role that we ought not lightly discount. 
59.  Ackerman, supra note 11, at 1062. 
60.  See generally LOUIS F. POST, THE DEPORTATIONS DELIRIUM OF NINETEEN-TWENTY: 
A PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF AN HISTORIC OFFICIAL EXPERIENCE (1923); WILLIAM PRESTON, 
JR., ALIENS AND DISSENTERS: FEDERAL SUPPRESSION OF RADICALS, 1903-1933 (1963). 
61.  The internees were released shortly before the Supreme Court decided Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). See IRONS, supra 
note 10, at 344. 
62.  OIG REPORT, supra note 5, at 105. 
COLEFINAL 4/30/2004 10:10 AM  
 
 
 
 
2004]                               The Priority of Morality                                  1769 
 
 
rules to limit the duration of emergency powers is thus necessary but hardly 
sufficient to the design of an emergency regime. No matter how long they 
last, emergency powers pose a host of difficult tradeoffs, between values of 
liberty, privacy, autonomy, and equality on the one hand, and those of 
efficacy, efficiency, and security on the other. Those tradeoffs cannot be 
sidestepped or solved by supermajoritarian escalators. 
This shortcoming in Ackerman’s approach is curious, given that his 
theory is expressly built on the insight that all emergencies are not alike. He 
argues,  correctly,  that  terrorist  threats  are  different  from  “existential” 
threats, and that natural disasters calling for emergency relief efforts are 
different from terrorist emergencies that invoke calls for preventing the next 
attack.63  He cites with approval Canada’s constitution, which recognizes 
four different types of emergency.64 Yet paradoxically, while Ackerman 
insists that all emergencies are not alike, he seems to assume that all 
emergency powers are alike. As its title indicates, his essay purports to 
address not preventive detention in particular, but emergency powers in 
general. With respect to preventive detention itself, Ackerman fails to 
adequately address why suspicionless preventive detention is justified as a 
normative matter, as I show in Part III. But other emergency powers would 
pose entirely different issues, even less susceptible to resolution by the 
supermajoritarian escalator. 
Ackerman’s choice of preventive detention as a paradigm may have 
been driven by the fact that it is at least theoretically susceptible to the time 
limits that his escalator is designed to impose. At least one salient issue 
raised by detention is its duration, and a detention authority expressly tied 
to enforceable time limits may therefore pose less serious due process 
concerns than the prospect of indefinite detention.65 But even where strictly 
limited to emergency periods, a preventive detention scheme is likely to 
have significant spillover effects that extend far beyond the emergency. For 
example, in the Emergency Detention Act of 1950, enacted at the height of 
the Cold War, Congress authorized an emergency scheme permitting 
preventive detention of persons deemed dangerous in specified emergency 
situations.66  The law remained on the books until 1971, when Congress 
 
 
 
63.  Ackerman, supra note 11, at 1057-58, 1061. 
64.  Id. at 1061-62. Ackerman cites only Canada’s constitution and Germany’s Basic Law as 
recognizing different types of emergency, but such recognition is not at all unusual. In fact, in a 
survey of seventy-nine national constitutions, Oren Gross found that the majority of them 
“differentiate among several types of emergencies.” Gross, supra note 15, at 21. 
65.  Compare  Zadvydas  v.  Davis,  533  U.S.  678  (2001)  (noting  that  serious  due  process 
concerns would be raised by indefinite detentions), with Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 123 S. Ct. 
1708 (2003) (distinguishing Zadvydas and finding no due process violation where an immigration 
statute imposed mandatory but not indefinite detention). 
66.  Emergency Detention Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, tit. II, § 103, 64 Stat. 1019, 1021 
(1950) (repealed 1971). 
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repealed it and barred the detention of any U.S. citizen except where 
expressly authorized by statute.67 Although Congress appropriated funds to 
build detention centers, the emergency detention statute was never invoked 
because no emergency was declared. But that does not mean that it did no 
damage to civil liberties. The FBI used the existence of this detention 
authority to justify extensive political spying in order to compile, maintain, 
and update lists of “dangerous” persons to be detained in the event an 
emergency was declared. In 1954, the FBI’s “Security Index” included 
26,174 persons.68  In the 1960s, the FBI’s list included civil rights leaders 
such as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.69 Toward the end of that same decade, 
the FBI instructed its agents generally to investigate for potential inclusion 
on the list not only the student activist group Students for a Democratic 
Society (SDS), but all persons living in communes.70 The supermajoritarian 
escalator would do absolutely nothing to limit such conduct, undertaken in 
preparation for emergencies to come, and the resulting damage to civil 
liberties would be done even if an emergency were never declared. 
For a host of other emergency powers posing threats to civil liberties, 
the supermajoritarian escalator would be not merely insufficient, but largely 
irrelevant. This is because many of the responses necessitated by the threat 
of terrorism are simply not susceptible to time limits. For example, the 
widely acknowledged need for better and more extensive intelligence and 
surveillance in order to identify and track terrorists who blend into the 
civilian  population  is  not  temporary.  The  changes  we  adopt  today  to 
respond to that concern are likely to be viewed as necessary forever. Thus, 
the threat that intelligence authorities pose to privacy cannot be resolved by 
resort to the supermajoritarian escalator.71 
For example, one of the most common diagnoses of the government’s 
failure to uncover and preempt the September 11 conspiracy holds that 
there  were  too  many  barriers  between  domestic  law  enforcement  and 
foreign intelligence agencies.72  This problem cannot be solved by ceding 
 
 
67.  18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000). See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, The Detention 
Power, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 153 (2004) (finding, in the context of the history of executive 
detention  in  the  United  States,  that  § 4001(a)  manifests  a  constitutional  mandate  requiring 
congressional authorization of any extrajudicial detention). 
68.  COLE, supra note 2, at 102. 
69.  Id. 
70.  Id. 
71. And as with preventive detention, even if one could posit a role for extraordinary 
intelligence authorities limited to declared states of emergency, the existence of those authorities 
on the books would likely have substantial spillover effects on normal times. If we know, for 
example, that our private records may be subject to secret surveillance when emergencies arise, 
our expectation of privacy is reduced not only during the emergency, but permanently, as we can 
no longer rely on an expectation that what we do will remain private. 
72.  See, e.g., MARKLE FOUND., PROTECTING AMERICA’S FREEDOM IN THE INFORMATION 
AGE   (2002),  http://www.markletaskforce.org/documents/Markle_Full_Report.pdf.  But  cf. 
Malcolm Gladwell, Connecting the Dots: The Paradoxes of Intelligence Reform, NEW YORKER, 
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short-term emergency powers to the Executive subject to a political process 
check; it requires a long-term solution. The stakes are considerable. In the 
past, we operated under two different paradigms—one for foreign 
intelligence directed at keeping track of foreign governments, agents, and 
powers, and a very different and much more restricted one for domestic law 
enforcement. While we may not want the CIA to be hemmed in by 
constitutional constraints in spying on foreign countries and agents abroad, 
the  abuses  revealed  by  the  Church  Committee  investigation  in  1976 
illustrate that we also do not want the FBI using CIA tactics to spy on 
domestic political dissenters.73 At the same time, the foreign/domestic 
distinction, while important to protecting civil liberties at home, may also 
impede coordinated efforts to track international terrorists, who are a 
legitimate subject of both foreign intelligence and domestic law 
enforcement. Reasonable people will differ about how to resolve this 
problem without unduly endangering political freedoms, but one thing 
should be indisputable: The supermajoritarian escalator is no solution at all. 
Cutting off funding for terrorist organizations, another major initiative 
in the post-September 11 world, is also not likely to be susceptible to a 
temporal political process solution. The goal here is to deprive violent 
groups of the support they need to survive.74 The danger is that penalizing 
all support to such groups, rather than restricting the prohibition to types of 
support  that  further  terrorist  activity,  imposes  guilt  by  association.75 
Currently, both criminal law and executive orders ban all support to a long 
list of groups and individuals that the government has labeled “terrorist,” 
without regard to the intention or effect of the support in question.76 These 
laws treat identically someone who sends coloring books to a day-care 
center and someone who sends a radiological bomb to a military unit, as 
 
 
Mar. 10, 2003, at 83 (noting the benefits of competition and the risks of hierarchical coordination 
in intelligence gathering and analysis). 
73.  See SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, FINAL REPORT OF THE 
SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. 
NO. 94-755 (1976). 
74.  See, e.g., William F. Wechsler, Strangling the Hydra: Targeting Al Qaeda’s Finances, in 
HOW DID THIS HAPPEN? TERRORISM AND THE NEW WAR 129 (James F. Hoge, Jr. & Gideon 
Rose eds., 2001). 
75.  See  COLE,  supra  note  2,  at  58-64;  David  Cole,  Hanging  with  the  Wrong  Crowd: 
Of Gangs, Terrorists, and the Right of Association, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 203. 
76.  See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B (West 2003); International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 
50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (2000); Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons 
Who Commit, Threaten To Commit, or Support Terrorism, Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 
49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001); COLE, supra note 2, at 75-78; Remarks on United States Financial 
Sanctions Against Terrorists and Their Supporters and an Exchange with Reporters, Remarks of 
President George W. Bush in the Rose Garden, 2001 PUB. PAPERS 1149 (Sept. 24, 2001); Press 
Release,  U.S.  Department  of  the  Treasury,  Progress  in  the  War  on  Terrorist  Financing  1-2 
(Sept. 11, 2003), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js721.htm (noting that 315 individuals and 
entities had been named as specially designated global terrorists). 
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long as both recipients are under the aegis of a group the government has 
labeled “terrorist” in a secret and largely unreviewable process.77 Such laws 
would criminalize even the actions of those who assist a group in human 
rights advocacy in order to encourage it to use peaceful rather than violent 
means to resolve its conflicts.78  Yet the government contends that if it is 
required to prove that donors specifically intend to further a group’s 
unlawful activities, it will be unable as a practical matter to stop a great deal 
of financial and other support. Here, too, the difficult issues of security and 
liberty cannot be solved by resorting to a political process safeguard. The 
focus on financing requires a long-term systemic response; it will not work 
if it is limited to five- to seven-month “states of emergency” following 
terrorist attacks. 
Consider, finally, the use of military authority to capture and detain 
persons fighting for the other side during a military campaign—the hotly 
disputed issue of “enemy combatants.” Here, of course, there is a role for 
time limits, but it has nothing to do with supermajoritarian escalators. The 
power to detain during wartime can and should be limited to the duration of 
the conflict. As the war on terrorism illustrates, however, the duration of the 
conflict may be extremely difficult to define, and may indeed be indefinite. 
Few dispute that under the laws of war, presidents in wartime have the 
power to detain the enemy incident to the Commander-in-Chief power, at 
least as applied to enemy forces on the battlefield. The difficult issues 
concern how far the authority extends—geographically and temporally—in 
an unconventional war, and what procedural and substantive rights are 
owed to those captured. Again, however one comes out on these issues, one 
thing is certain: A supermajoritarian escalator does not provide the answer. 
The general point should be clear. The need to respond effectively to 
terrorist threats presents a host of difficult and distinct civil liberties issues. 
A precommitment to limiting the time period during which emergency 
powers can be exercised not only fails to provide a global solution to the 
problem  Ackerman  identifies,  but  on  many  issues  does  not  provide 
any solution at all. In addition, even on the issue the escalator does 
address—the duration  of  emergency powers—we might  reach  different 
 
 
 
77.  See COLE, supra note 2, at 75-78. 
78.  I represent a human rights organization, the Humanitarian Law Project, which had been 
providing human rights advocacy training and assistance to the Kurdistan Workers Party, the 
principal political representative of the Kurds in Turkey. The Project did so precisely to encourage 
the Party to pursue its grievances through nonviolent, lawful means. When the Secretary of State 
designated the Kurdistan Workers Party a “terrorist organization,” however, it became a crime for 
the Project to continue to provide such assistance. We brought suit in federal court, and the courts 
thus far have held that the statute’s bar on the provision of “training,” “personnel,” and “expert 
advice or assistance” is unconstitutional. See Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2003); Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, No. CV 03-6107 ABC, 
2004 WL 547534 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2004). 
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judgments for  different powers. We  might be  willing, for  example, to 
permit the use of the military domestically for certain very short-term 
emergency responses, but be willing to allow nonmilitary responses to an 
emergency situation to continue for longer periods. It is not obvious, in 
other words, that all emergency powers ought to have the same “shelf life.” 
So we might need to adopt a whole series of emergency-power-specific 
supermajoritarian escalators of varying lengths for different emergency 
powers. If so, any truly fruitful emergency constitution will be far less 
elegant and more complicated than Ackerman’s approach acknowledges. 
Ackerman might object that some of the above measures are not 
technically “emergency” powers, but nonemergency “national security” 
measures. Yet from the standpoint of the concerns animating Ackerman’s 
piece, that would be mere semantics. His stated concern is for the fate of 
civil liberties in a world in which terrorist attacks are a frequent 
phenomenon. That fate will be affected as much, if not more, by 
nonemergency than by emergency measures. Indeed, just as the threat of 
international terrorism seems to have exploded the distinction between 
domestic  law  enforcement  and  foreign  intelligence,  so  the  “war  on 
terrorism” has substantially obliterated the distinction between emergency 
and nonemergency powers. Vice President Dick Cheney has called the 
current climate “a new normalcy.”79 The threats to civil liberties posed by 
responses to  a  terrorist attack need  not  take  the  form of  “emergency” 
powers. Without employing formal emergency powers, the administration 
has adopted sweeping measures since September 11 that infringe on rights 
of speech, association, privacy, and due process, the right to counsel, 
criminal trial rights, and equal protection of the law, to name just a few.80 If 
we are to solve the problem Ackerman identifies—a continuing threat to 
civil liberties presented by the likelihood of recurring terrorist attacks— 
Ackerman’s emergency constitution is patently insufficient. 
 
C.  Times of Emergency 
 
Finally, Ackerman’s supermajoritarian escalator rests on an unproven 
and  unprovable  premise  that  emergencies  are  likely  to  be  short-lived. 
Absent that premise, it would make no sense to precommit to a scheme that 
will terminate emergency powers after a period of several months even 
where seventy-nine percent of the legislature believes that the need for 
emergency authority continues. Ackerman confidently claims that “[o]ur 
constitutional problem is not that the government will be too weak in the 
 
 
79.  Bob Woodward, CIA Told To Do “Whatever Necessary” To Kill Bin Laden; Agency and 
Military Collaborating at “Unprecedented” Level; Cheney Says War Against Terror “May Never 
End,” WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2001, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
80.  See generally COLE, supra note 2, at 17-82 (discussing the response to September 11). 
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short run, but that it will be too strong in the long run.”81  But how do we 
know ex ante that the error will always be to overestimate the length of time 
emergency authority is needed, so much so that we should commit to being 
legally bound by a twenty-one-percent minority on the question? In the face 
of a threat, denial may be as powerful an irrational response as panic. What 
happens if the twenty-one-percent minority is in denial and underestimates 
the threat? 
In fact, there is substantial evidence that emergencies are not likely to 
be as short-lived as Ackerman posits. Consider the post-September 11 
experience in the United States. More than two years after the attacks, 
Osama bin Laden remains at large, al Qaeda continues to pose a deadly 
threat, new security measures are adopted almost weekly, and the 
government has repeatedly had to issue heightened alerts and cancel many 
airplane flights (despite suffering substantial criticism each time it does so). 
The reality is that as long as a trained and devoted organization of terrorists 
has designs on killing as many innocent civilians as it can, the threat 
continues. As the aftermath of September 11 illustrates, even when we 
devote massive military, intelligence, and law enforcement resources to the 
job, the notion that a clandestine terrorist organization will be defeated and 
neutralized in a matter of months is patently unrealistic. Perhaps we could 
be  confident  that  we  would  obtain  eighty-percent  consensus  on  the 
continued need for extraordinary measures, but it is unclear why we should 
rest our faith on that proposition. 
Other nations’ experiences further illustrate the potential for long-term 
emergencies. Israel has been in a state of emergency since its founding in 
1948,82  and while one can reasonably ask in what sense a fifty-six-year 
emergency is truly an emergency, news reports remind us almost daily that 
Israel continues to confront a very real and all-too-often-realized threat of 
terrorist attacks. The United Kingdom operated for thirty years under a state 
of emergency triggered by its struggle with the Irish Republican Army.83 
Ackerman criticizes Poland’s choice to impose a strict time limit on 
emergency power as creating a “gap between law and reality,”84  but his 
own regime is vulnerable to the same critique. The eighty-percent 
requirement means that after six to seven months, twenty-one percent of the 
nation’s representatives could disband emergency powers even when 
seventy-nine percent agree that emergency conditions continue. As 
Alexander Hamilton recognized long ago, the very nature of emergencies is 
that they are unpredictable: “[I]t is impossible to foresee or define the 
extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent & 
 
 
81.  Ackerman, supra note 11, at 1040. 
82.  Gross, supra note 23, at 1073. 
83.  Id. at 1074. 
84.  Ackerman, supra note 11, at 1054. 
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variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them.”85 Especially 
when it comes to inherently unpredictable emergencies, why would the 
majority ever precommit to such a scheme? 
In sum, the premises for Ackerman’s proposal are open to question in 
three fundamental respects: He is too pessimistic about courts and too 
optimistic   about   legislatures;   his   “political   process”   one-size-fits-all 
solution resolves very little about the appropriate extent of emergency 
powers; and his view of the likely duration of emergencies is simply 
unrealistic. 
 
II. EFFICACY 
 
How would Ackerman’s plan actually work in practice? A brief 
examination of the details of Ackerman’s proposal suggests that his faith in 
supermajoritarian escalators has blinded him to the difficult practical and 
normative questions posed by preventive detention. In this Part, I offer 
three criticisms of his proposal. First, it fails to address in any way the 
existing preventive detention tactics employed in the wake of September 11 
and, as a result, would do little to regulate preventive detention on the 
ground. Second, having abandoned any threshold requirement of suspicion 
for detention, it proposes an awkward and ill-conceived compensation 
scheme  for  “innocents”  that  would  deny  compensation  to  many  who 
deserve it while compensating others who do not. Finally, despite 
Ackerman’s  heavy  reliance  on  the  escalator  as  a  quid  pro  quo  for 
emergency authority, the proposal as formulated creates a stunning 
disconnect  between  the  emergency  power  granted—suspicionless 
preventive detention—and the political process safeguard that Ackerman 
champions. Many if not most instances of preventive detention would never 
even be affected by the supermajoritarian escalator, as the detentions would 
terminate after forty-five to sixty days, before the supermajoritarian 
requirements were even triggered. For these detainees, Ackerman’s 
supermajoritarian  political  process  safeguard  would  not  only  be 
insufficient, but meaningless. 
 
A.  Preventive Detention by Any Other Name 
 
Even if Ackerman’s proposal were to become law, it would likely do 
little to restrain the actual practice of preventive detention in emergencies. 
It would have had literally no effect, for example, on the Ashcroft and 
Palmer roundups, because it leaves in place the legal regimes these 
Attorneys  General  exploited  to  effectuate  mass  preventive  detention. 
 
 
85.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 106-07 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003). 
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Palmer’s and Ashcroft’s campaigns show that preventive detention does not 
require a formal emergency regime, but can be effected through existing 
nonemergency immigration and criminal justice provisions. Given those 
provisions, left entirely unaddressed by Ackerman’s essay, it is not clear 
why the President would invoke Ackerman’s framework statute or 
constitutional amendment if it were on the books. By exploiting the 
discretion the Executive already enjoys under existing law, he could engage 
in preventive detention without declaring an emergency, and would not 
need to worry about the supermajoritarian escalator or Ackerman’s other 
checks. 
Consider, in this regard, the fate of section 412 of the USA PATRIOT 
Act.86 This controversial provision creates a congressionally authorized 
regime of preventive detention for “terrorist aliens.” It allows the Attorney 
General to detain any foreign national, even a lawful permanent resident, 
simply by certifying that he has “reasonable grounds to believe” that the 
individual  “is  described  in”  the  immigration  law’s  antiterrorism 
provisions.87 Those provisions in turn define terrorism so broadly as to 
include  the  provision  of  any  material  support  to  any  group  that  the 
Secretary of State or the Attorney General labels a terrorist organization— 
even if the purpose, intent, and effect of the individual’s support was solely 
to further lawful, nonviolent activity.88 The immigration law’s definition of 
terrorism also encompasses virtually any use or threat to use a weapon 
against person or property, conceivably covering a permanent resident 
woman who picks up a kitchen knife and threatens her abusive husband in a 
domestic dispute, or a foreign national who breaks a beer bottle and 
threatens another in a barroom brawl.89 
Section 412 allows such persons to be held without any charges for up 
to seven days, but at Congress’s insistence it also requires that thereafter the 
detainee either be charged with an immigration violation or released. If 
charged with an immigration violation, no matter how minor, the foreign 
national is then subject to indefinite detention on the Attorney General’s 
say-so. He is subject to continued detention even if he is granted relief from 
removal, that is, even if he prevails in his deportation proceeding, and is 
lawfully permitted to remain in the United States.90 This is akin to keeping 
a  prisoner  locked  up  after  he  has  been  pardoned.  However,  again  at 
 
 
86.  Uniting  and  Strengthening  America  by  Providing  Appropriate  Tools  Required  To 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 412(a), 
115 Stat. 272, 350-52 (2001) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)). 
87.  8 U.S.C.A. § 1226a(a)(3) (West 2003). 
88.  Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(cc), (vi)(II); COLE, supra note 2, at 61. 
89.  See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b); COLE, supra note 2, at 65-66. While there is 
no evidence of deportations under these provisions for such garden-variety threats of violence yet, 
the examples illustrate how sweeping the power given to the Attorney General is. 
90.  8 U.S.C.A. § 1226a(a)(2). 
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Congress’s insistence, section 412 does provide for habeas corpus review in 
the federal courts.91 
When  Congress  was  considering  section  412,  the  administration 
insisted that this authority was necessary in order to detain suspected 
terrorists.  Yet  more  than  two  years  after  its  enactment  into  law,  the 
Attorney General has never invoked section 412. He has been able to 
subject over 5000 foreign nationals to preventive detention without resort to 
its provisions, by instead using preexisting immigration and criminal law 
authorities.92   Many  of  those  detainees  were  arrested  and  held  without 
charges for much longer than seven days.93 And many were held for months 
on end without any judicial review.94  Under preexisting immigration law, 
the Attorney General has discretion to detain foreign nationals charged with 
immigration violations pending the outcome of their removal proceedings, 
although such detention generally requires proof that the individual poses 
either a risk of flight or a danger to the community.95  The Justice 
Department used that discretionary detention authority to deny bond to all 
immigration detainees deemed “of interest” to the September 11 
investigation, without regard to whether it had any evidence whatsoever 
that they were dangerous, a flight risk, or in any way connected to 
terrorism.96  It interfered with their access to attorneys and sought delays 
and  continuances in  bond  hearings  to  disguise  the  fact  that  it  had  no 
evidence justifying detention without bond.97 It promulgated a rule, 
subsequently declared unconstitutional by five federal judges, that permits 
immigration prosecutors to keep foreign nationals detained even after an 
immigration judge rules that there is no basis for denying bond.98  And it 
kept individuals in detention for months after their immigration charges 
were fully resolved, not because it had any affirmative evidence that they 
 
 
 
91.  Id. § 1226a(b). 
92.  COLE, supra note 2, at 23-25. 
93.  OIG REPORT, supra note 5, at 30. 
94.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 47, at 52-53; OIG REPORT, supra note 5, at 1-7; 
see  also  Second  Amended  Class  Action  Complaint  and  Demand  for  Jury  Trial  ¶¶ 1-2,  4-5, 
70-73, Turkmen v. Ashcroft (E.D.N.Y. filed June 18, 2003) (No. 02 CV 2307 (JG)), 
http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/september_11th/docs/TurkmenSecondAmendedComplaint.pdf. I 
am counsel for plaintiffs in this case. 
95.  8 U.S.C. § 1226a (2000); In re Drysdale, 20 I. & N. Dec. 815, 817 (B.I.A. 1994) (“Once 
it is determined that an alien does not present a danger to the community or any bail risk, then no 
bond should be required.”). 
96.  OIG REPORT, supra note 5, at 76; see also COLE, supra note 2, at 18-21, 30 (discussing 
one such detainee, Ali Al-Maqtari, and the ordeal of 738 others). 
97.  OIG REPORT, supra note 5, at 78-80. 
98.  Custody, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (2004). This regulation has been declared unconstitutional in 
Zavala v. Ridge, No. C04-00253 JSW, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3620 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2004); 
Ashley v. Ridge, 288 F. Supp. 2d 662 (D.N.J. 2003); Uritsky v. Ridge, 286 F. Supp. 2d 842 (E.D. 
Mich. 2003); Bezmen v. Ashcroft, 245 F. Supp. 2d 446 (D. Conn. 2003); and Almonte-Vargas v. 
Elwood, No. CIV.A. 02-CV-2666, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12387 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2002). 
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posed any danger, but simply because the FBI had not gotten around to 
“clearing” them.99 
Where a person “of interest” could not be charged with an immigration 
violation, prosecutors searched for a criminal charge—any charge. 
Individuals were charged with lying to FBI agents and the grand jury, credit 
card fraud, “trespassing” in a hotel room they were renting, and carrying a 
knife one-quarter inch longer than permitted under state law.100 Where 
neither a criminal nor an immigration charge was available, the Justice 
Department invoked the material witness statute.101 This statute permits 
detention without probable cause of any criminal activity, on a showing that 
the individual has testimony material to a criminal trial or grand jury 
proceeding and would not be likely to appear if served with a subpoena.102 
The Justice Department appears to have used this statute to hold people 
whom it suspected while it investigated them further. Much about the 
material witness detentions is secret; the government will not even say how 
many material witnesses it has detained. In November 2002, however, the 
Washington Post had identified forty-four such persons, almost half of 
whom had never been called to testify in any proceeding.103 
Through these tactics, all relying on preexisting immigration and 
criminal authority, the Attorney General was able to effectuate a mass 
preventive detention campaign without ever invoking section 412. As a 
result, he was able to evade the restrictions—including federal court 
review—that Congress had  insisted upon adding to  section 412  before 
giving the Attorney General that authority.104 
Future Attorneys General would likely take much the same approach to 
Ackerman’s  proposal  were  it  to  become  law.  Rather  than  invoke  an 
authority subject to the supermajoritarian escalator, they might well prefer 
to use preexisting laws to carry out preventive detention. If so, Ackerman’s 
 
 
 
99.  OIG REPORT, supra note 5, at 71. 
100.  COLE, supra note 2, at 35. 
101.  18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000); see also COLE, supra note 2, at 35-39. 
102.  See generally United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003) (sustaining the use 
of the material witness statute to detain potential grand jury witnesses after September 11). 
103.  Steve  Fainaru  &  Margot  Williams,  Material  Witnesses:  Law  Has  Many  in  Limbo: 
Nearly Half Held in War on Terror Haven’t Testified, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2002, at A1. 
104. Similarly, in 1996 Congress gave the Attorney General authority to deport “alien 
terrorists” using secret evidence that neither the foreign national nor his attorney could confront or 
rebut. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 401, 
110 Stat. 1214, 1258-68 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1537). The law creates a special “Alien 
Terrorist Removal Court” with an Article III federal judge to conduct the hearing, and provides a 
number of safeguards for the foreign national. This provision has never been invoked. The INS 
repeatedly used secret evidence against foreign nationals in immigration proceedings after the 
1996 law was enacted, but consistently did so outside the Alien Terrorist Removal Court, where 
the safeguards provided by the 1996 law did not apply and the adjudicator was not an Article III 
judge,  but  an  immigration  judge  who  lacked  the  power  to  declare  immigration  laws  and 
regulations unconstitutional. 
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provision would be as  ineffectual in  regulating preventive detention as 
section 412 has been. 
Ackerman claims that his proposal would affect at least one case of 
post-September 11 preventive detention—that of Jose Padilla, the American 
citizen arrested at O’Hare Airport and held since June 2002 as an “enemy 
combatant.” Ackerman asserts that if his law were on the books, Padilla’s 
case would be a “no-brainer,” because the courts would hold the President 
to the more limited detention authority that Ackerman’s law would 
provide.105  But that is not at all self-evident. Ackerman’s law would not 
change the Bush Administration’s argument, namely that Congress’s 
authorization to use military force against al Qaeda106  inherently includes 
the authority to detain the enemy until the military conflict ends—a 
traditional  exercise  of  military  authority  expressly  authorized  by  the 
Geneva Conventions and the customary laws of war.107 Padilla’s case is 
admittedly  a  stretch,  but  the  Supreme  Court  has  already  upheld  the 
detention of United States citizens captured here as enemy combatants in 
wartime.108  And few would dispute the administration’s authority to hold 
Zacarias Moussaoui, an admitted al Qaeda member arrested in Minnesota, 
as a prisoner of war if it so chose. 
Unless Ackerman’s law were understood to preempt military detention 
of enemy soldiers in military conflicts, it would not resolve Padilla’s case. 
The existence of a more limited form of preventive detention authority for 
nonwartime emergencies in the form of Ackerman’s proposed statute (or 
even constitutional amendment) would not supersede the longstanding 
wartime authority absent an express indication to that effect.109  Ackerman 
 
 
 
105.  Ackerman, supra note 11, at 1081-82. 
106.  Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (to be 
codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note). 
107.  See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 14, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (2004) 
(No. 03-1027), 2004 WL 113598; COLE, supra note 2, at 39-46 (discussing enemy combatant 
designation authority); John C. Yoo & James C. Ho, The Status of Terrorists, NAT’L SEC. L. REP., 
Dec. 2003, at 1; see also Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed, 
72 U.S.L.W. 3568 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2004) (No. 03-1245); Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 
2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1353; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. 
granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004) (No. 03-6696); Vladeck, supra note 67, at 181-92 (surveying the 
authority issues in Padilla). 
108.  See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
109.  Ackerman points to Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), and 
asserts that “[i]f the branches resolved such sensitive matters [as emergency powers] through a 
framework statute, there would be little question that the Court would hold subsequent presidents 
to the terms of the deal.” Ackerman, supra note 11, at 1082 n.128. But although Congress did just 
that in the War Powers Resolution, courts have in fact consistently declined to hold the President 
to the terms of that deal. See generally JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: 
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 61-63 (1993); Michael Ratner & 
David Cole, The Force of Law: Judicial Enforcement of the War Powers Resolution, 17 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 715, 761-65 (1984) (discussing Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), 
aff’d per curiam, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). Moreover, there is no reason to think that the 
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never argues that his law is meant to supersede the authority to hold 
prisoners of war; if he did, the law would be even less likely to be adopted. 
Thus, Ackerman’s law would not in fact resolve the one case of preventive 
detention he asserts it would affect. Moreover, Ackerman does not even 
claim that his law would have any bearing on the vast majority of the war 
on terrorism’s enemy combatant detentions, most of which stem from 
battlefield captures in Afghanistan. 
Thus, at best, Ackerman’s proposal might theoretically affect one of the 
over 5000 domestic preventive detentions and countless more overseas 
detentions thus far imposed in the war on terrorism. If his goal is to halt the 
abuse of basic civil liberties associated with preventive detention, the 
proposal fails on its face. 
 
B.  What’s Innocence Got To Do with It? 
 
Ackerman seems deeply ambivalent as to what makes preventive 
detention lawful. On the one hand, he describes his proposal as authorizing 
“the government to detain suspects without the criminal law’s usual 
protections of probable cause or even reasonable suspicion,”110 
acknowledges that “[t]here will be dragnets sweeping up many innocent 
people,”111 and declares that the principal purpose of his proposal is to 
reassure a public in panic (notably, not to catch terrorists).112 On the other 
hand, he insists that the proposal should include financial compensation for 
all “innocents who will be caught up in dragnets launched under the 
government’s emergency powers of detention.”113 
But Ackerman’s concept of innocence is far from clear. He says that he 
would limit compensation to those who are not convicted,114 but never 
specifies what a sufficient conviction would be. What about someone 
detained without any basis for suspicion whatsoever, but subsequently 
convicted of credit card fraud, hiring an undocumented domestic worker, 
using a false Social Security number, or lying to an FBI agent? What about 
 
 
“terms  of  the  deal”  Ackerman  proposes  would  include  forfeiting  the  traditional  executive 
authority to detain the enemy in military conflicts. 
The Second Circuit, by a 2-1 margin, recently ruled that the President lacks authority to hold 
U.S. citizens captured far from the battlefield as “enemy combatants,” in light of Congress’s 
express statement that “‘[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United 
States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.’” Padilla, 352 F.3d at 718 (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 4001(a)). Whether that holding will withstand Supreme Court review remains to be seen. But 
§ 4001(a) is quite different from Ackerman’s proposed law, as it bars detention of U.S. citizens 
absent express statutory authorization. Nothing in Ackerman’s proposal would do so. 
110.  Ackerman, supra note 11, at 1037. 
111.  Id. at 1062. 
112.  Id. at 1037. 
113.  Id. at 1045-46. 
114.  Id. at 1065 n.88. 
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someone not convicted at  all, but deported for overstaying his visa or 
failing to file a notice of change of address within ten days of moving? It 
appears that Ackerman would not treat these persons as “innocent” and 
would therefore deny them compensation. Absent any basis for suspicion, 
however, there is no justification for their preventive detention. Surely the 
accident of discovering a nonterrorist law violation after the fact ought not 
retroactively justify the initial suspicionless preventive detention. But 
because Ackerman would turn compensation not on the absence of any 
objective grounds for suspicion at the time of detention, but on ultimate 
innocence, his proposal would seem to have precisely that effect. Thus, 
Ackerman’s scheme would deny compensation to many persons arbitrarily 
detained, simply because some law violation, no matter how technical, was 
later discovered. 
At the other extreme, what about someone detained on a showing that 
amounted to probable cause of involvement in a terrorist plot, but who then 
turned out to have been innocent? Under any rational preventive detention 
scheme, we would want that person, even if ultimately innocent, to have 
been detained in the first place. But if that is the case, there is nothing 
“wrong” with his preventive detention, and he should not receive 
compensation. Just as a search based on probable cause is not rendered 
unlawful by the fact that it comes up empty, so an arrest based on probable 
cause does not become illegal if the arrestee ultimately turns out to be 
innocent.  Ackerman  notes  that  American  law  generally  denies 
compensation to such persons in the criminal justice system, as well as to 
those  who  are  arrested  and  detained  as  material  witnesses  (who  are 
generally not charged with any crime).115 He does not question these 
precedents. But these precedents make clear that compensation should turn 
not on ultimate innocence, but on whether the detention was legally 
authorized at the outset. 
Ackerman contends that preventive detention that ensnares innocents 
through an “erroneous legal process” is different, and therefore should 
trigger compensation.116 But like his discussion of “innocence,” this claim 
begs the question of what makes the process “erroneous.” If his law 
expressly permits detention without any objective basis for suspicion, on 
the understanding that it reassures the general public, there is nothing 
“erroneous” about detaining a person who turns out to be innocent. Where 
detention is legally justified without any showing of suspicion, detention of 
“innocents” is not an error, but a fully contemplated, legally authorized 
result. 
 
 
 
 
115.  Id. at 1063 n.81 (discussing Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578 (1973)). 
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Ackerman does suggest two substantive constraints on the preventive 
detention decision. It could not be based on personal animus, nor could it be 
based solely on the detainees’ race, color, sex, language, religion, or social 
origin.117 But the former is largely unenforceable, especially where no 
objective basis for suspicion is required, as no one will admit to personal 
animus. And the latter constraint is almost entirely ineffectual—even the 
Japanese internment was not based solely on race, but on race and location 
on the West Coast. Under Ackerman’s statement of the standard, detaining 
all Muslim men between the ages of eighteen and fifty-five after the next 
terrorist attack would be perfectly permissible, because it would not be 
based on personal animus, nor solely on religion or sex. 
The legal process Ackerman proposes for detention similarly reflects a 
failure to think through the consequences of permitting detention without 
any objective evidence of suspicion. Ackerman insists that during the 
detention period, federal courts would have no power to review whether 
there is a factual basis for holding any given detainee. Indeed, as we have 
seen, his express goal is to authorize detention without any individualized 
suspicion. At the same time, however, he would require the government to 
appear at a hearing at the outset of the detention to state “the grounds of 
suspicion that support the detention.”118 But if no individualized suspicion 
is required for the detention, and the court has no power to act on the 
statement in any event, why must there be any statement of grounds? 
Ackerman maintains that the obligation to offer reasons will deter bad faith 
detentions and facilitate after-the-fact assessments of the legality of the 
detention. But again, if no basis for suspicion is required, what would such 
an after-the-fact assessment assess? Ackerman claims that these statements 
might  be  used  as  the  basis  for  punitive  damages  suits  against  the 
government after detention has ended.119  But if the detention need not be 
justified by any objective basis for suspicion, it would seem that any 
statement whatsoever—short of “I arrested him because I don’t like him” or 
“I arrested him solely because he is Arab”—would be legally sufficient to 
avoid governmental liability. 
Ackerman argues that substituting after-the-fact financial incentives for 
contemporaneous judicial review will deter officials from detaining 
innocents  in  the  first  place.  But  as  shown  above,  whether  someone 
ultimately turns out to be innocent of a criminal or immigration violation 
has little or nothing to do with whether there was a basis for fearing that he 
posed  a  danger  sufficient  to  warrant  preventive  detention,  and  thus 
whatever   deterrence   is   created   would   likely   be   counterproductive. 
 
 
 
117.  Id. at 1075-76. 
118.  Id. at 1075. 
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Compensating “innocents” will deter the detention of apparently dangerous 
persons who might ultimately turn out to be innocent—persons who 
probably ought to have been detained. At the same time, it will fail to deter 
the detention of persons who pose no terrorist threat whatsoever but are 
likely to have committed a minor crime or immigration violation—persons 
who ought not to have been preventively detained. Thus, turning 
compensation on ultimate innocence does not rationally regulate detention 
at the outset. 
Moreover, Ackerman exacerbates these deterrence problems by 
proposing   that   all   detainees   be   compensated   initially,   leaving   the 
government to try to “claw back” the compensation from those who turn 
out to be guilty.120 As any defense lawyer will attest, recovering debts from 
convicted criminals is notoriously difficult, so in practice this rule would 
likely compensate everyone, even the guilty. If officials know that as a 
practical matter everyone will be compensated, what incentive does the 
proposal give  them to  distinguish the  innocent from the  guilty? If  the 
money could be recovered, this compensation scheme would create an 
incentive to vigorously investigate and prosecute all preventive detainees, 
on even the most minor offenses, in order to avoid a subsequent ruling that 
the detainees were “innocent.” But do we really want to encourage the kind 
of overzealous and vindictive prosecution that the military demonstrated 
recently in charging Captain James Yee, the Muslim chaplain at 
Guantánamo Bay, with adultery and possession of pornography when its 
sensational “espionage” claims appeared to be evaporating?121 
Ackerman also does not explain why, as a deterrence matter, a financial 
compensation scheme would be an improvement over direct judicial review 
of the grounds for detention at the time of arrest. Putting aside the obvious 
fact that compensation can never adequately remedy the irreparable injury 
of losing one’s liberty, an after-the-fact compensation scheme is likely to 
either overdeter or underdeter. Substantial compensation would risk 
overdeterrence, causing officials not to arrest persons who ought to be 
detained; the risk that the person might turn out to be innocent in the end 
would not make the detention worthwhile, even if otherwise objectively 
justified.122 If, as is more likely given the lessons of history that Ackerman 
 
 
120.  See id. at 1065 n.88. 
121.  When pressed, the government ultimately dropped all charges against Captain Yee. For 
a discussion of the background and the government’s changing position, see Neil A. Lewis, 
Charges Dropped Against Chaplain, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2004, at A1; and Neil A. Lewis & 
Thom Shanker, As Chaplain’s Spy Case Nears, Some Ask Why It Went So Far, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
4, 2004, at A1. 
122.  Cf. William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881 
(1991) (arguing that proposed tort schemes for remedying Fourth Amendment violations would 
similarly pose problems of overdeterrence and underdeterrence, as compared to the exclusionary 
rule, which deters by removing the benefit of the violation). 
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reviews,123 the compensation were not substantial, the payments would not 
only underdeter, but might well have the opposite effect of encouraging 
unnecessary detentions by legitimating them—“Yes, we locked you up 
despite your innocence and despite lacking any evidence to establish that 
you were suspicious, but we paid you for it.” 
 
C.  What’s the Supermajoritarian Escalator Got To Do with It? 
 
The core of Ackerman’s idea is to offer the Executive substantial 
emergency power in exchange for the political safeguard of a 
supermajoritarian escalator. It therefore comes as a surprise to learn, when 
one works through the details of Ackerman’s preventive detention regime, 
that the supermajoritarian escalator would have no effect whatsoever on 
many and probably most preventive detentions. The stated quid pro quo for 
granting the Executive preventive detention authority is that it is subject to 
the supermajoritarian escalator. Yet when Ackerman turns to the specifics 
of his detention authority, he proposes a rigid forty-five- to sixty-day 
preventive detention period.124 Outfitting this regime with “an adaptation of 
the ‘double jeopardy’ principle to block . . . transparent abuse,” he insists 
that preventive detention will never last longer than two months.125 
It is likely that the vast majority of preventive detentions will take place 
in the weeks immediately following a terrorist attack. For those individuals, 
the supermajoritarian escalator is likely to do no work whatsoever. The 
initial sixty-percent escalator is not triggered until the emergency has lasted 
two to three months; the eighty-percent escalator does not kick in until six 
to  seven  months  have  passed.  What  will  lead  to  the  release  of  most 
detainees is not the escalator, but the rigid forty-five- to sixty-day time limit 
that Ackerman would impose. 
Thinking through the actual implementation of Ackerman’s proposal 
reveals a host of structural flaws and internal contradictions. It is possible 
that these are simply drafting errors, details to be ironed out in committee 
once the basic outlines of Ackerman’s proposal are accepted. But in my 
view, they reflect a deeper flaw: the failure to come to terms with why 
preventive detention is authorized, when it should be permitted, and for 
what reasons. As this Part has illustrated, the supermajoritarian escalator 
offers little help in resolving these difficult normative issues. It is to those 
questions that I now turn. 
 
 
 
 
 
123.  See Ackerman, supra note 11, at 1063-64. 
124.  See id. at 1075. 
125.  Id. at 1074. 
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III. MORALITY 
 
At bottom, what is most troubling about Ackerman’s proposal is its 
implicit normative judgment: that it is permissible to lock up human beings 
without any showing that they are actually dangerous in order to “reassure” 
the American public in the wake of a terrorist attack. Given the serious 
deprivation that incarcerating a human being entails, our manifest inability 
to predict the future, and the history of abusive mass preventive detention 
campaigns in the past, we should be extremely reluctant to authorize 
detention in the absence of a threshold showing of dangerousness, and we 
should insist on prompt procedural protections designed to reduce the 
likelihood that persons who pose no risk of danger will be detained. Yet in 
his zeal for the supermajoritarian escalator, Ackerman has advocated up to 
two months of suspicionless detention, without any opportunity for release 
as long as the emergency continues. Under Ackerman’s emergency powers, 
an indisputably innocent person detained without any objective basis for 
suspicion would have no way of obtaining his release, and at best would 
receive (an undetermined amount of) compensation if the authorities are 
unable to find some charge within those two months that can stick. 
This proposal has three significant normative flaws. First, while 
preventive detention is undoubtedly warranted under certain circumstances, 
Ackerman has advanced no good reason for authorizing suspicionless 
preventive detention. To authorize preventive detention without suspicion is 
in effect to authorize lawlessness, and the offer of compensation if the 
authorities cannot drum up a criminal or immigration violation after the fact 
does not cure the infirmity. In essence, Ackerman would authorize arbitrary 
detention, a clear violation of both American constitutional law and 
international  human  rights  law.  Second,  any  acceptable  scheme  of 
preventive detention must provide for prompt judicial review while the 
detention is ongoing—yet Ackerman would deny that review until the 
detention has  ended. Here, procedure and substance merge, because in 
order for preventive detention to be normatively acceptable, it must be 
subject to meaningful judicial review—that is, review that can free a person 
who is wrongly detained. Third, while it is difficult to imagine any 
justification for detention without suspicion, it is certainly not justified by 
Ackerman’s claim that detention might “reassure” a public in panic. This 
essentially therapeutic rationale fails to treat people as ends in themselves, 
presumptively deserving to be free, and instead treats them as means to the 
end of reassurance—as objects whose liberty can be taken without regard to 
any  threat  they  pose.  Such  a  practice  violates  even  Ackerman’s  own 
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principles of social justice, advanced in his book Social Justice in the 
Liberal State.126 
Let me be clear, because Ackerman’s response127  appears to rest on a 
misunderstanding. My normative or moral claim is not that preventive 
detention in all forms is unacceptable. Preventive detention has long been a 
legitimate part of our legal landscape. When justified by sufficiently serious 
harms and subject to fair judicial review procedures to minimize erroneous 
deprivations of liberty, there is nothing wrong with preventive detention. 
Nor is there anything wrong with reducing the threshold criteria for 
suspicion under certain circumstances, where necessary to avert serious 
harm. My claim is that it is normatively unacceptable to impose preventive 
detention, as Ackerman’s proposal would, (1) without any basis for 
suspicion, (2) without any meaningful opportunity for release of wrongfully 
detained persons, and (3) for the purpose of “reassuring” a public in panic. 
 
A.  The Necessity for Suspicion 
 
Preventive detention implies that there is something to prevent. It is 
normatively and constitutionally acceptable only where there is reason to 
believe that an individual left free poses some serious danger. In wartime, 
for example, one army can detain the other’s soldiers as prisoners of war on 
the ground that an enemy soldier by definition poses a danger to one’s own 
troops.128 In the criminal and immigration settings, preventive detention is 
warranted where there is reason to believe that a charged individual will 
either abscond or do harm to the community while awaiting resolution of 
the charges against him.129 And civil commitment is justified only on a 
strong showing of both dangerousness and a mental defect rendering the 
detainee incapable of controlling his dangerous conduct.130 In each setting, 
the sine qua non for preventive detention is objective evidence establishing 
that the individual to be detained poses a risk that warrants preventing. 
Ackerman  would  do  away  with  this  definitional  requirement  of 
objective suspicion. But if detention is not justified by objective grounds to 
suspect that the individual to be detained poses a danger, it literally serves 
no “preventive” purpose. It would be one thing to contend that in an 
emergency, the standard for suspicion ought to be reduced—say, from 
probable cause to reasonable suspicion, or by permitting the government to 
 
 
126.  ACKERMAN, supra note 19. 
127.  Bruce Ackerman, This Is Not a War, 113 YALE L.J. 1871 (2004). 
128.  Cf. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
129.  See, e.g., Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1719-22 (2003); United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49 (1987). 
130.  See, e.g., Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412-13 (2002); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 
71, 80 (1992). 
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establish a risk of danger by a preponderance of the evidence rather than by 
clear and convincing evidence. The stakes in an emergency may well justify 
temporary detention on a less stringent showing of dangerousness than 
would be required during normal times. But to dispense altogether with the 
threshold requirement of suspicion makes no sense. 
Where people are detained without any objective basis for suspicion, 
the possibility that their detention will serve the national security is no more 
than random, as the Palmer Raids, the Japanese internment, and the post- 
September 11 detentions dramatically illustrated.131 Indeed, eliminating the 
requirement of objectively reasonable suspicion is more likely to hinder 
than to further security. History suggests that when government officials are 
freed of the obligation to offer objective evidence of suspicion, they are 
likely to resort to crude stereotypes. Even where there may be some rational 
basis for the stereotype, as in the supposition that al Qaeda is likely to 
consist predominantly of Arab and Muslim men, such profiling is, in most 
cases, vastly overbroad, and inevitably incurs resentment in the targeted 
group. That resentment in turn reduces the likelihood that members of the 
targeted group will cooperate in helping to locate the truly bad actors, while 
fueling  recruits  to  the  cause  against  us.132   The  Justice  Department’s 
targeting of Arabs and Muslims in the wake of September 11 has identified 
few terrorists, but it has alienated large segments of the Arab and Muslim 
communities, both here and abroad.133  Thus, suspicionless preventive 
detention has no more than a random chance of furthering security, and 
poses a significant likelihood of actually undermining security. 
Current doctrine accords with these sentiments: Constitutional and 
international law both reject suspicionless preventive detention. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has upheld preventive detention in only very limited 
circumstances, starting from the proposition that “[f]reedom from 
imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of 
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process] Clause protects.”134 The Court has upheld 
preventive detention only where an individual (1) is either in criminal or 
immigration proceedings and has been shown to be a danger to the 
community or a flight risk,135  (2) is dangerous because of a “harm- 
threatening mental illness” that impairs his ability to control himself,136 or 
 
 
131.  See supra text accompanying notes 1-10. 
132.  See COLE, supra note 2, at 47-56. 
133.  Id. at 189-97. 
134.  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001); see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 
346, 356 (1997); Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80; Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746. 
135.  See, e.g., Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (1994)); see also 
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 752-53; Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 541-42 (1952). 
136.  Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; see also Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412-13 (2002); 
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357. 
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(3) is an enemy alien during a declared war.137 The first two situations 
require a showing of objectively based suspicion of dangerousness. The 
third  is  more  problematic.  Detention  of  “enemy  aliens”  rests  on  a 
categorical presumption that in wartime, citizens of the state with which we 
are at war are, for that reason alone, potential risks—an assumption that the 
Japanese internment experience calls into serious question. In all of these 
settings,  however,  the  justification for  detention  turns  on  the  potential 
danger posed by the individual to be detained. 
In 2003, the Supreme Court upheld categorical preventive detention of 
so-called  “criminal  aliens”—foreign  nationals  charged  with  being 
deportable for having been convicted of specified “‘aggravated 
felon[ies].’”138  Pointing to findings that foreign nationals in this category 
often fail to show up for their hearings and commit further crimes, the 
majority in Demore v. Kim reasoned that Congress could make a broad 
determination that all persons falling into this category posed a sufficient 
risk of flight or danger to the community to justify a limited period of 
preventive detention.139 But while the Demore majority dispensed with the 
requirement of individualized risk assessments, it did so only on objective 
evidence that a specifically defined category of offenders posed risks of 
flight and danger. And the Court stressed that the mandatory detention 
statute  permits  individuals  who  claim  they  do  not  fall  within  the 
legislatively defined category an immediate hearing to assert that claim.140 
Ackerman’s  proposal  is  based  on  no  finding  of  categorical  risk  and 
provides no prompt review for those wrongly detained. 
Ackerman might contend that the “reassurance rationale” in a time of 
emergency constitutes a new “special and narrow circumstance” warranting 
preventive detention in emergencies. But the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
 
 
137.  Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 171-73 (1948) (upholding the Alien Enemy Act of 
1798, 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-24 (2000), which allows suspicionless detention of “alien enemies” during 
a declared war). 
The government may also impose preventive detention where an individual has testimony 
material to a criminal proceeding and is likely to abscond if served with a subpoena. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3144. The Supreme Court has never opined on the constitutionality of that power, but lower 
courts have generally upheld it, including courts in the aftermath of September 11. See, e.g., 
United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003); Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933 
(9th  Cir.  1971);  In  re Application  of  the U.S.  for  a  Material  Witness  Warrant, Pursuant  to 
18 U.S.C. § 3144, for John Doe, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Material witness detention 
requires an individualized showing to a court that the detainee poses a risk of flight necessitating 
detention. 18 U.S.C. § 3144. 
138.  Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1712 n.1 (2003) (quoting 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)). 
139.  Id. at 1714-16, 1720-21. In my view, Demore is wrongly decided; preventive detention 
should always require an individualized showing of flight risk or danger to the community. If an 
individual poses no danger or flight risk, there is literally nothing to prevent, and detention would 
be arbitrary. See id. at 1731-33 (Souter, J., dissenting); David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due 
Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003, 1007 (2002). 
140.  Demore, 123 S. Ct. at 1712 & n.3 (discussing the so-called Joseph hearing). 
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civil commitment suggests that it would not countenance such a general 
rationale. In Kansas v. Crane, the Court warned that civil commitment must 
not  “become  a  ‘mechanism  for  retribution  or  general  deterrence’— 
functions  properly  those  of  criminal  law,  not  civil  commitment.”141  If 
general deterrence is an impermissible justification for civil detention, the 
equally general “reassurance rationale” also ought to be off the table—not 
because it is a function of the criminal law, but because it is arbitrary to 
incarcerate individuals who have done nothing wrong and pose no danger, 
simply to “reassure” others. 
Other nations also reject suspicionless preventive detention, even in 
response to terrorism. Israel, for example, which for years has confronted 
the frequent terrorist attacks that Ackerman posits we might face in the 
future, does not permit preventive detention without an objective basis for 
suspicion. As Israel’s High Court of Justice recently ruled, even in the 
occupied territories in the context of an antiterrorist military campaign, 
preventive detention “demands that the detaining authority possess an 
evidentiary basis sufficient to establish suspicion against the individual 
detainee.”142  It noted that arbitrary detention is a violation of both Israeli 
and international law, and that “[d]etentions that are not based upon the 
suspicion that the detainee endangers, or may be a danger to, public peace 
and security, are arbitrary.”143  Israel’s Supreme Court has also ruled that 
detainees who do not pose a security risk may not be held as “bargaining 
chips”  for  negotiation  with  a  terrorist  group,  further  confirming  the 
necessity for a showing of dangerousness.144 
The United Kingdom, also a victim of a long line of terrorist attacks, 
authorizes  warrantless  arrests,  but  only  of  a  person  whom  the 
“constable . . . reasonably  suspects  to  be  a  terrorist.”145   Canada  permits 
preventive detention of citizens only on suspicion that the detainee would 
commit a terrorist act, and of permanent residents only on certification that 
 
 
 
 
 
141. 534 U.S. at 412 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 372-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
Similarly, in Foucha v. Louisiana the Court invalidated a Louisiana statute that authorized civil 
commitment on a finding of dangerousness without any finding of mental illness, stressing that 
“our present system . . . with only narrow exceptions and aside from permissible confinements for 
mental illness, incarcerates only those who are proved beyond reasonable doubt to have violated a 
criminal law.” 504 U.S. 71, 83 (1992). 
142.  H.C. 3239/02, Marab v. IDF Commander in the W. Bank, 57(2) P.D. 349, 364. 
143.  Id. at 366; see also id. at 366-67 (“The circumstances of his detention must be such that 
they raise the suspicion that he—he individually and no one else—presents a danger to security.”). 
144.  Cr.A. 7048/97, Anonymous v. Minister of Def., 54(1) P.D. 721, 743; see also Emanuel 
Gross, Human Rights, Terrorism and the Problem of Administrative Detention in Israel: Does a 
Democracy Have the Right To Hold Terrorists as Bargaining Chips?, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 721 (2001). 
145.  Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 41. 
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there are “reasonable grounds to believe [he or she] is a danger to national 
security.”146 
International law categorically prohibits “arbitrary detention,”147 and 
detention without suspicion is the very definition of arbitrary. The Council 
of Europe has provided that “[a] person suspected of terrorist activities may 
only be arrested if there are reasonable suspicions.”148 This principle holds 
even in emergencies, and the U.N. Human Rights Committee, interpreting 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, has stated that 
“arbitrary deprivations of liberty” violate a peremptory, nonderogable norm 
of international law, and therefore are never justified, even in times of 
emergency.149     Taken   together,   these   authorities   suggest   a   uniform 
consensus that detention without any basis for suspicion is unjustifiable, 
even in response to terrorism, and even in times of emergency. Ackerman’s 
proposal to amend the world’s constitutions would require revising this 
fundamental international norm. 
To maintain that suspicionless preventive detention is not normatively 
acceptable is not to be an “absolutist” who contends that “[n]o matter how 
large the event, no matter how great the ensuing panic, we must insist on 
the strict protection of all rights all the time.”150 That caricature of civil 
libertarians, found at the beginning of Ackerman’s essay, is a straw man. I 
have heard no one since September 11 argue that “we must insist on the 
strict protection of all rights all the time,” even if it means “governmental 
paralysis.”151 Very few individual liberties are absolute; virtually all require 
some  sort  of  balancing  and  permit  infringement  where  sufficiently 
important government interests are advanced. Thus, under constitutional 
 
 
 
146.  Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, ch. 27, § 82(1), 2001 [II] S.C. at 37. 
147.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, art. 9, para. 
1, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2, at 26 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) 
(“No  one  shall  be  subjected  to  arbitrary  arrest  or  detention.”).  Article  5  of  the  European 
Convention on Human Rights also prohibits arbitrary detention. Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 226 (entered 
into force Sept. 3, 1953). And Article 7 of the American Convention on Human Rights prohibits 
“arbitrary arrest” and requires prompt judicial review for “any person detained.” American 
Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 7, paras. 3, 5-6, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123, 147; see also NIHAL JAYAWICKRAMA, THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW: NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 379 (2002) 
(“Detention is arbitrary if it is ordered without an objective assessment of its necessity.”); id. at 
380 (“If there are no criteria, express or implied, which govern the exercise of a discretion, 
detention resulting from the exercise of such discretion is arbitrary.”). 
148.  COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, GUIDELINES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
THE  FIGHT  AGAINST  TERRORISM   art.  VII(1)  (2002),  http://www.coe.int/T/E/Human_rights/ 
h-inf(2002)8eng.pdf. 
149.  U.N. GAOR Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 29, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 
40, para. 11, U.N. Doc. A/56/40 (2001); see also International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, supra note 147. 
150.  Ackerman, supra note 11, at 1030. 
151.  Id. 
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doctrine, the protection for speech gives way when advocacy is intended 
and likely to produce imminent lawless action,152 the right of political 
association gives way when a member specifically intends to further the 
unlawful activities of the group,153  and the writ of habeas corpus may be 
suspended when “in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may 
require it.”154  Privacy must give way to “[]reasonable” searches and 
seizures,155 and the process due when the state deprives one of life, liberty, 
or  property  turns  on  a  balancing  of  individual  interests,  the  risk  of 
erroneous deprivation of such interests through procedures used, and 
government interests.156 Even racial discrimination may be justified if 
narrowly tailored to further compelling state interests.157 Each of these core 
constitutional rights, including the right to physical liberty, acknowledges 
circumstances  in  which  infringements  are  justified  in  the  name  of 
compelling government interests. Emergencies may well justify striking the 
balance differently than in ordinary times. Reducing the threshold required 
for preventive detention in emergencies may sometimes be warranted, but 
eliminating the requirement of suspicion altogether would violate core 
principles of constitutional and international law. 
 
B.  The Necessity of Judicial Review 
 
The second flaw in Ackerman’s preventive detention scheme is 
procedural—the deferral of any judicial review of the legality of detention 
until after the detention has been completed. But here process and substance 
are joined: Any acceptable system of domestic preventive detention must 
allow the detainee to seek judicial review while he is detained, at least 
absent the sort of extreme emergency envisioned by the Suspension Clause. 
The failure to provide prompt judicial review, moreover, would be a fatal 
flaw even if Ackerman were to impose some objective threshold of 
suspicion as a substantive matter, because without judicial review, any such 
substantive standard would be unenforceable. 
Ackerman admittedly would only defer, not eliminate, judicial review. 
Under his proposal, the courts would eventually review the legality of 
 
 
 
152.  See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
153.  See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (prohibiting guilt based on association 
except where the government proves specific intent to further illegal ends of the group); Scales v. 
United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) (noting the constitutional prohibition on guilt by association, 
but upholding a conviction where the government proved specific intent to further the illegal ends 
of a group). 
154.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
155.  Id. amend. IV. 
156.  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
157.  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (holding that affirmative action based 
on express consideration of race satisfies strict scrutiny under certain conditions). 
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detention, after the detention period of up to two months had been 
completed. But because the loss of liberty is irreparable,158 to defer judicial 
review until the detention is concluded is to deny a meaningful remedy at a 
meaningful time. And as noted above, because Ackerman’s preventive 
detention authority would not require any objective basis of suspicion for 
detention in the first place, it is unclear what post hoc judicial review would 
accomplish. 
Deferring judicial review until after the detention has been completed 
runs  counter  to  constitutional  and  international  law.  Where  the  U.S. 
Supreme Court has upheld preventive detention, it has consistently 
emphasized the critical importance of a prompt adversarial hearing on 
whether the conditions warranting detention are present. 
In the civil commitment and criminal bail settings, the Court has made 
clear that the process due when the state deprives a person of his liberty 
includes prompt judicial review. Thus, in United States v. Salerno, the 
Court found that the Bail Reform Act satisfied substantive due process 
because detention without bail required both a showing of probable cause 
for arrest for “a specific category of extremely serious offenses,” and also 
required clear and convincing evidence, established in a “full-blown 
adversary hearing,” that “no conditions of release can reasonably assure the 
safety of the community or any person.”159 Procedural due process was 
satisfied only because of extensive safeguards, including the defendant’s 
rights to counsel, to testify, to proffer evidence, and to cross-examine 
witnesses; the government’s obligation to prove dangerousness by clear and 
convincing evidence; and the obligation that an independent judge guided 
by “statutorily enumerated factors” issue a written decision subject to 
“immediate appellate review.”160 In its recent decision upholding preventive 
detention of “criminal aliens” in the immigration setting, the Court again 
stressed the availability of a prompt hearing for any person who claimed he 
or she did not fall within the category subject to detention.161 Thus, without 
prompt judicial review, preventive detention violates both substantive and 
procedural due process. 
The fundamental importance of judicial review to any lawful system of 
preventive  detention,  like  the  requirement  of  objective  grounds  for 
suspicion, is widely acknowledged by other nations and international law as 
well. The European Court of Human Rights has ruled that the United 
Kingdom violated the European Convention on Human Rights when it 
 
 
 
158.  See Martin v. Young, 134 F. Supp. 204, 209 (N.D. Cal. 1955) (“That such a loss of 
liberty is irreparable is so clear as to require no further statement.”). 
159.  481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987). 
160.  Id. at 751-52. 
161.  Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1712 & n.3 (2003). 
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failed to bring detainees before a judge for four days and six hours.162 The 
U.N. General Assembly in 1988 ratified the Body of Principles for the 
Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, 
which provides that “a person shall not be kept in detention without being 
given an effective opportunity to be heard promptly by a judicial or other 
authority.”163 The U.N. Human Rights Committee has interpreted this to bar 
delays beyond “a few days.”164 Both the Human Rights Committee and the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights have provided that the right to 
challenge the legality of detention promptly is nonderogable, even in 
emergencies.165  As Israel’s High Court of Justice has stated, noting these 
international precedents, “Judicial review is the line of defense for liberty, 
and it must be preserved beyond all else.”166 
Canada requires those arrested on suspicion of terrorism to be brought 
before a judge within twenty-four hours.167  The United Kingdom requires 
that such suspects be brought before a judge within forty-eight hours.168 
Israel’s High Court recently held that detaining individuals without judicial 
review for twelve days violates basic principles of Israeli and international 
law.169 And the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to 
require those arrested without a warrant to be brought before a judge for a 
 
 
162. Brogan v. United Kingdom, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988); see also Koster v. 
Netherlands, 221 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991); McGoff v. Sweden, 83 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 28 
(1984); HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE 121-22 (Lord Lester of Herne Hill & David Pannick 
eds., 1999); NIGEL S. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
340 (2d ed. 1999) (arguing that “general international law” requires prompt judicial review of 
detention). 
163.  Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., 76th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 49, princ. 
11.1, at 298, U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (1988). 
164.  Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR Human Rights Comm., 37th Sess., 
Supp. No. 40, at 95, U.N. Doc. A/37/40 (1982). In Kalenga v. Zambia, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. 
Comm.,  Communication  No.  326/1988  (July  27,  1993),  U.N.  Doc.  CCPR/C/48/D/326/1988 
(1993),  the  U.N.  Human  Rights  Committee  ruled  that  Zambia  violated  Article  9  of  the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights when it held a person for almost one month 
without informing him of the charges against him or bringing him promptly before a judge. Yet 
Ackerman would routinely allow individuals to be held up to forty-five to sixty days without 
charges and without any meaningful access to a judge to challenge the legality of the detention 
and seek release. 
165.  The Human Rights Committee noted that “[i]n order to protect non-derogable rights, the 
right to take proceedings before a court to enable the court to decide without delay on the 
lawfulness of detention, must not be diminished [in all emergencies except for in armed conflict].” 
U.N. GAOR Human Rights Comm., supra note 149, para. 16; see also INT’L BAR ASS’N’S TASK 
FORCE  ON  INT’L  TERRORISM, INTERNATIONAL  TERRORISM: LEGAL  CHALLENGES  AND 
RESPONSES 66-69 (2003). 
166.  H.C. 2320/98, El-Amla v. IDF Commander in the Judea and Samaria Region, 52(3) P.D. 
346, 350; see also H.C. 3239/02, Marab v. IDF Commander in the W. Bank, 57(2) P.D. 349, 
368-69 (“Judicial intervention stands before arbitrariness; it is essential to the principle of rule of 
law.”). 
167.  Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 83.3 (1985). 
168.  Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 41(3). 
169.  Marab, 57(2) P.D. at 368. 
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prompt probable cause hearing, presumptively within forty-eight hours of 
arrest.170 
Critical to any acceptable scheme of preventive detention, in other 
words, is prompt judicial review to assure that those who are not dangerous 
are not locked up.171 As a result, preventive detention authority is arbitrary 
absent prompt and meaningful judicial review. As the Israeli High Court 
explained, “Judicial review is not ‘external’ to the detention. It is an 
inseparable part of the development of the detention itself.”172 The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights expressly requires that 
“anyone who is  deprived of  his liberty by arrest or  detention shall be 
entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may 
decide without delay on the  lawfulness of  his  detention and order his 
release if the detention is not lawful.”173 Yet Ackerman proposes a scheme 
under which meaningful judicial review is denied until the preventive 
detention is complete. Such a scheme is in clear contravention of 
international and constitutional law. 
The problems with Ackerman’s preventive detention proposal are 
brought into relief by comparing it to another eminent law professor’s 
recent proposal for emergency powers—Alan Dershowitz’s torture 
warrant.174 In his essay, Ackerman joins the chorus of critics who have 
condemned Dershowitz’s proposal to authorize torture in “ticking time 
bomb” scenarios through a judicial warrant process.175  Ackerman argues 
that torture warrants would legitimate lawlessness.176 But the problem with 
Dershowitz’s proposal is not that it is “lawless”; it is fully cloaked in the 
formalities of the rule of law. He would permit torture only after 
investigators had made a compelling individualized showing to an 
independent judge that the person to be tortured has information that would 
save  lives  and  that  torture  was  the  only  way  to  obtain  it.177    Thus, 
 
 
 
170.  County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 45 (1991); see also Gerstein v. Pugh, 
420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975). 
171.  See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987). 
172.  Marab, 57(2) P.D. at 373. 
173.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 147, art. 9, para. 4, S. 
EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2, at 26-27, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176 (emphasis added). 
174.  ALAN  M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY  TERRORISM  WORKS: UNDERSTANDING  THE  THREAT, 
RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 142-63 (2002). 
175. See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: Constitutional 
Constraints on Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 278 (2003); John T. Parry & 
Welsh S. White, Interrogating Suspected Terrorists: Should Torture Be an Option?, 63 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 743 (2002); Michael Ratner, Moving Away from the Rule of Law: Military Tribunals, 
Executive Detentions and Torture, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1513 (2003); Chanterelle Sung, Book 
Review, Torturing the Ticking Bomb Terrorist: An Analysis of Judicially Sanctioned Torture in 
the Context of Terrorism, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 193 (2003) (reviewing DERSHOWITZ, supra 
note 174). 
176.  Ackerman, supra note 11, at 1072-73. 
177.  DERSHOWITZ, supra note 174, at 158-61. 
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Dershowitz would  require  objective,  individualized evidence  subject  to 
independent judicial review applying, in essence, strict scrutiny. 
The infirmity in Dershowitz’s proposal lies not in its failure to provide 
for the rule of law, but in the substantive notion that torture can be 
legitimated if wrapped in sufficient procedure. The fundamental 
constitutional problem with torture is one of substantive due process, not 
procedural due process. Torture violates core norms of human decency and 
respect, and no amount of procedural protections can justify it. 
Preventive detention plainly does not fall into the same category as 
torture. But suspicionless or arbitrary detention comes close. As the Human 
Rights Committee has noted, arbitrary detention, like torture, violates a 
peremptory norm of international law, meaning that it cannot be justified 
even in emergencies. Preventive detention is not arbitrary where narrowly 
circumscribed to meet a sufficiently compelling need. But Ackerman’s 
proposal, which would permit suspicionless detention of innocents while 
barring any opportunity to seek release, is entirely arbitrary, and even more 
susceptible to a charge of lawlessness than Dershowitz’s. 
 
C.  Therapeutic Detention 
 
Ackerman does not seek to justify preventive detention on the ground 
that it will make us safer. He argues only that it will make us feel safer. 
That “reassurance rationale,” he maintains, is enough to warrant detaining 
people without individualized suspicion. In my view, placing people behind 
bars without a basis for suspicion in order to make other people feel better 
is not a normatively acceptable justification for detention—in emergency or 
nonemergency times. 
Ackerman concedes that the threat terrorists pose to a nation is typically 
not “existential,” but rather a threat to its “effective sovereignty.”178 Even 
attacks on the previously unthinkable scale of September 11 do not threaten 
the existence of the United States or its government. Rather, Ackerman 
maintains, they place the state’s “effective sovereignty in doubt” by 
spreading panic.179  Such emergencies require not the defense of the 
existence of the nation, as would an all-out war, but measures that will 
“reassure” the public that the sovereign is in charge and can respond 
effectively. Sounding disturbingly like Attorney General Ashcroft himself, 
 
 
178.  Others have also recognized this feature of terrorist attacks. See,  e.g., Oren Gross, 
Cutting Down Trees: Law-Making Under the Shadow of Great Calamities, in THE SECURITY OF 
FREEDOM: ESSAYS ON CANADA’S ANTI-TERRORISM BILL 39, 40-42 (Ronald J. Daniels et al. eds., 
2001);   Paddy   Hillyard,   In   Defence   of   Civil   Liberties,   in   BEYOND    SEPTEMBER    11: 
AN ANTHOLOGY OF DISSENT 107, 111 (Phil Scraton ed., 2002) (“[W]hile political violence poses 
a threat to democracy the more important threat comes from the response to it by attacking the 
very principles on which it is based.”). 
179.  Ackerman, supra note 11, at 1037. 
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Ackerman writes that “government must act visibly and decisively to 
demonstrate to its terrorized citizens that the breach was only temporary, 
and that it is taking aggressive action to contain the crisis and to deal with 
the prospect of its recurrence.”180 
It is useful to compare the reassurance rationale to the rationale the 
Framers considered sufficient to warrant suspension of habeas corpus. The 
Suspension Clause, the Constitution’s only explicit “emergency” provision, 
permits suspension only “when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public 
Safety may require it.” On the Framers’ view, habeas corpus was to be 
suspended only in very specific and threatening situations, and even then 
only where necessary to public safety. In Ackerman’s hands, this provision 
would effectively be rewritten to permit suspension “when in times of panic 
the public psyche would be reassured by it.” In my view, this therapeutic 
rationale is simply not an acceptable moral justification for depriving a 
person of his liberty. In fact, I doubt that Ackerman himself really believes 
this to be a normatively acceptable justification—his ambivalence about 
“innocents” and “error” discussed in Part II above hints at his own 
misgivings. Yet in his zeal to offer something in exchange for the 
supermajoritarian escalator, he has advocated just that. 
In light of the disastrous precedents of the Palmer and Ashcroft raids 
and the Japanese internment, it is striking that all Ackerman can say in 
favor of his preventive detention scheme is that it might “reassure” a 
panicked public. Nowhere does he claim that preventive detention will in 
fact make us safer. But upon reflection, the absence of any discussion about 
actual security gains from preventive detention may not be an accident. 
Where preventive detention is not predicated on any objective evidentiary 
basis for suspecting that the detainee in fact may be dangerous, it cannot 
plausibly serve any purpose other than the symbolic one that Ackerman 
identifies. 
In his response, Ackerman suggests that my critique may be based on a 
misunderstanding, because the stated purpose of his preventive detention 
scheme is “to reassure the public that the situation is under control, and that 
the state is taking effective short-term actions to prevent a second strike.”181 
Ackerman italicizes the last clause, and contends, for the first time, that 
“this is a two-prong test,” and that I “entirely ignore[] this second prong.”182 
If Ackerman now suggests that the government would be permitted to 
employ his scheme only where it could make an affirmative showing that 
suspicionless preventive detention is an “effective short-term action to 
prevent a second strike,” I am encouraged. But nowhere in his original 
 
 
 
180.  Id. 
181.  Ackerman, supra note 127, at 1880 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). 
182.  Id. 
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essay did he suggest that such a showing would be required, nor does he 
now suggest to whom or how such a showing would be made. The passage 
Ackerman quotes from his original essay states only that the purpose is to 
“reassure the public” that the state is taking effective steps, not to ensure 
that the steps are actually effective. Moreover, if proof of effectiveness 
were truly an independent predicate to invocation of Ackerman’s scheme, 
the scheme could never be invoked, because a suspicionless preventive 
detention scheme could never satisfy any real test of effectiveness. Some 
basis for suspicion would seem to be the absolute minimal prerequisite to 
any truly effective preventive detention scheme, yet it is precisely that 
requirement that Ackerman proposes to eliminate. 
Ackerman’s example of a quarantine, offered in his response as refuting 
my moral objections to suspicionless preventive detention for reassurance 
purposes, only proves my point. Ackerman hypothesizes an outbreak of a 
“new killer virus” with a lengthy latency period, no way to identify it 
during latency, and the capability of generating an epidemic chain reaction 
if not immediately contained. He argues that if preventive detention of “the 
surrounding residents most likely to be infected” would be acceptable under 
these circumstances—and of course it would be—then my moral objections 
are undermined.183 But preventive detention under Ackerman’s hypothetical 
would be reasonable precisely because it relies on an objective basis for 
suspicion—proximity to the released virus—and because by hypothesis that 
is the only way to avert a catastrophic harm. Objective suspicion and 
necessity  to  avert  serious  harm  are  precisely  what  make  preventive 
detention normatively and constitutionally acceptable. Yet Ackerman 
proposes to do away with any requirement of suspicion, and makes no 
claim that his scheme is necessary to make us safe, but only that it will 
provide the psychic benefit of making people feel “reassured.” 
Symbols are, of course, important. And the perception of safety is 
undoubtedly a valuable public good. But incarcerating people without any 
objective evidence of suspicion simply to make the public feel better can be 
justified, if at all, only on the crudest utilitarian grounds. That justification 
would violate Kant’s Categorical Imperative, by condoning official 
treatment of human beings as means rather than ends in themselves.184  It 
would also violate more sophisticated versions of utilitarianism, as John 
Rawls has shown. In Two Concepts of Rules, Rawls rejects the contention 
 
 
183.  Id. at 1881. 
184.  IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS WITH CRITICAL 
ESSAYS 52 (Robert Paul Wolff ed. & Lewis White Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1969) (1785). 
(“Now, I say, man and, in general, every rational being exists as an end in himself and not merely 
as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will. In all his actions, whether they are directed to 
himself or to other rational beings, he must always be regarded at the same time as an end.”); id. 
at 54 (“The practical imperative, therefore, is the following: Act so that you treat humanity, 
whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.”). 
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that a strict utilitarian might favor punishment of an innocent where it is for 
the greater good of society.185 He reasons, essentially from a rule-utilitarian 
perspective, that creating an institution that permitted such punishment (or 
as Rawls calls it, “telishment”) would have disastrous effects. He asks, 
“How is one to avoid giving anything short of complete discretion to the 
authorities to telish anyone they like?”186  And in such a system, he notes, 
people would have no basis for knowing whether a detained person had 
been punished (for committing a crime) or telished (to make the society feel 
better), and would have to worry about whether they would be the next to 
be  detained. Indeed, he  points out,  precisely for  these reasons, such a 
system would be unlikely to advance the public good, and thus could not 
even be justified on utilitarian grounds.187 
The same critique can be leveled at Ackerman’s system. In order for 
preventive detention to reassure the public, the public must believe that the 
government is detaining persons who actually pose a terrorist threat, that is, 
people as to whom there are objective grounds for suspicion. If the public 
knows that the legal regime permits detention of anyone, regardless of any 
objective basis of suspicion, then there would be nothing reassuring about 
the fact that the government had detained a large number of people, as 
detaining innocents protects nobody, and implicitly threatens all who are 
innocent with the possibility that they too might be detained. 
Indeed,  suspicionless  preventive  detention  to  reassure  the  public 
appears to violate even Ackerman’s own framework for a morally just 
political order. In Social Justice in the Liberal State, Ackerman criticizes 
utilitarianism along neo-Kantian lines, maintaining that it “conceives each 
individual as if he were merely an instrument for the greater fulfillment of 
the idea of happiness that is dominant in the community at a particular 
time.”188  Ackerman advocates instead a “neutrality” principle, pursuant to 
which  the  state  could  never  “reduc[e]  some  citizens  to  powerlessness 
simply because others find this a pleasing prospect.”189  Unequal sacrifice, 
he argues, “is legitimate only if it can fairly be said to enrich the rights of 
all citizens.”190 Yet it is hard to see how incarcerating innocents without an 
opportunity for release for up to sixty days in order to make the public feel 
better does not reduce those detainees to “powerlessness simply because 
others find this a pleasing prospect.” And this unequal sacrifice clearly 
could not be said to enrich the rights of “all citizens.” 
 
 
 
 
185.  John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955). 
186.  Id. at 12. 
187.  Id. 
188.  ACKERMAN, supra note 19, at 343. 
189.  Id. at 344. 
190.  Id.; see also id. at 313. 
COLEFINAL 4/30/2004 10:10 AM  
 
 
 
 
2004]                               The Priority of Morality                                  1799 
 
 
In sum, the reassurance rationale fails to meet basic requirements of 
morality. It holds that an innocent person, who objectively poses no danger 
to anyone, may be detained for up to two months in order to serve the 
general needs of reassuring the public and sending a message that the 
government remains in control. Without more, such general symbolic 
purposes are an impermissible basis for taking an innocent individual’s 
liberty. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Emergency Constitution seeks to respond to a real problem—the 
tendency of emergency powers to last well beyond the emergency itself. Its 
proposal to condition emergency powers on ever-increasing supermajority 
approval from the legislature might well succeed in ensuring that states of 
emergency do not last far beyond the emergency that called them into 
being. That in itself would be an important contribution to the problem of 
emergency powers. 
But in its effort to solve that problem at the global level, for all the 
world’s constitutions and for all emergencies sparked by terrorist attacks, 
Ackerman’s proposal suffers from its own ambition. It would not provide a 
solution to most of the threats to civil liberties that the “war on terrorism” 
entails, because most of the necessary responses to terrorism are not 
susceptible to strict time limitations. The need for better and more 
coordinated intelligence, more stringent limits on access to weapons of 
mass destruction and to potential targets of terrorist attacks, and restrictions 
on funding of terrorist conspiracies, for example, pose serious challenges to 
civil liberties, but those challenges cannot be solved by sharply limiting the 
time period during which such responses could be invoked. Moreover, even 
where emergency powers are susceptible to time limits, their effects on civil 
liberties are not, as illustrated by the FBI’s extensive political spying in the 
1950s and 1960s, justified by a never-invoked preventive detention scheme. 
Thus, while Ackerman presents his proposal as a universal remedy for all 
nations and all emergency powers, his proposal does not even begin to 
address most of the threats to civil liberties that the war on terrorism has 
raised. 
The only specific emergency power Ackerman actually addresses is 
preventive detention. But here his solution would create more problems 
than it would solve. His emergency constitution would do little or nothing 
to remedy the abuses that characterized the preventive detention campaign 
that followed September 11, in which thousands of people having no 
connection to terrorism were detained as “suspected terrorists” using 
immigration law, criminal law, and the laws of war. Far from responding to 
any of these abuses, Ackerman’s proposal would simply add yet another 
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tool  for  preventive  detention,  this  one  imposing  no  requirement  of 
suspicion, and expressly barring any opportunity for innocent persons to 
seek their release. By legitimating preventive detention without requiring 
any threshold of individualized suspicion, Ackerman’s proposal would 
encourage the detention of innocents. Ackerman acknowledges this “cost” 
but insists that it is warranted in order to reassure a public in panic, and that 
it can be offset by compensation after the fact. While the threat of future 
terrorism may well warrant rethinking constitutional structure, detaining 
innocent human beings to reassure a panicked public is not the sort of 
“sweeping revision” the world, or the United States, should adopt. 
